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ARTICLE
TARGETING THE TEXAS CITIZEN
PARTICIPATION ACT: THE 2019 TEXAS
LEGISLATURE’S AMENDMENTS TO A
MOST CONSEQUENTIAL LAW
AMY BRESNEN*
LISA KAUFMAN**
STEVE BRESNEN***
No one else was in
the room where it happened.
No one really knows how the game is played,
the art of the trade
how the sausage gets made.

—Lin-Manuel Miranda, Hamilton, (2015)****
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Association, AT&T, and the Texas Family Law Foundation during negotiations on H.B. 2730.
The authors wish to thank Lee Parsley, General Counsel, Texans for Lawsuit Reform, for his
contributions to this Article.
This Article is based on an article that was originally published in the September 2019 issue of
the Texas Bar Journal. Portions of it have been edited and reprinted with permission.
**** There was, in fact, a room where the negotiations happened, in the instance discussed. The
authors of this Article worked with a variety of stakeholders and legislators to negotiate extensive
changes to the Texas anti-SLAPP statute. Only a few clarifying amendments were made on the House
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I. INTRODUCTION
Few laws enacted by the Texas Legislature in recent decades have had a
greater impact on civil litigation than the Texas Citizen’s Participation Act
(“TCPA”).1 The original statute’s seemingly boundless application
confounded judges obligated to apply the law as written.2 Although the
original TCPA legislation passed through the Legislature unanimously, after
eight years in existence, the desire to narrow the statute’s scope united a
wide array of legal, business, and even medical groups—including
organizations frequently at odds with each other. During the Texas 86th
Legislature Regular Session (2019), those groups put aside their traditional
differences toward one goal: fixing the TCPA in order to save the statute
from itself.3 In response to widespread calls for change, the bill4 passed
with only one vote against it.5 The new law became effective September 1,
2019 and now applies to actions filed on or after September 1, 2019.6
The 2019 revisions fell into four broad categories:
1. Narrowing key definitions, including, most importantly, the
definition of “matter of public concern;”

1. Act of June 17, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 341, § 2, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 961 (amended 2019)
(current version at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 27.001–.011). See generally TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. §§ 27.001–.011 (codifying the TCPA).
2. See Serafine v. Blunt, 466 S.W.3d 352, 394–95 (Tex. App.—Austin 2015, no pet.) (Pemberton,
J., concurring) (“The TCPA presents difficult issues of statutory construction that broadly impact not
only the sound operation of our civil justice system, but the sometimes-competing rights of Texans
that the statute was expressly intended to balance and reconcile.”); see also Molinet v. Kimbrell,
356 S.W.3d 407, 411 (Tex. 2011) (“The plain meaning of the text is the best expression of legislative
intent unless a different meaning is apparent from the context or the plain meaning leads to absurd or
nonsensical results.”).
3. See generally Sen. Comm. Rep., Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 2730, 86th Leg., R.S. (2019) (witness
list) (providing the witness list for the 86th Legislature Regular Session); see also Testimony on Tex.
H.B. 2730 Before the House Comm. on Judiciary and Civ. Juris., 86th Leg., R.S. (Apr. 1, 2019)
(transcript available from Office of the House Committee Coordinator).
4. Act of June 1, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 378, § 11, 2019 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 378 (current
version at CIV. PRAC. & REM. §§ 27.001–.011) (H.B. 2730, authored by the Rep. Jeff Leach, Chairman
(R-Allen) and joint-authored by Reps. Four Price (R-Amarillo), Joe Moody (D-El Paso), Dustin
Burrows (R-Lubbock) and Morgan Meyer (R-Dallas). Sponsored in the Senate by the Sen. Bryan
Hughes (R-Mineola) and co-sponsored by Sen. Beverly Powell (D-Burleson)).
5. See Roll Call: TX HB2730 | 2019–2020 | 86th Legislature, LEGISCAN, https://legiscan.com/
TX/rollcall/HB2730/id/855089 [https://perma.cc/CM82-ZF7K] (charting votes for the bill).
6. Act of June 2, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 378, §§ 1–12, 2019 Tex. Sess. Laws Ch. 378 (current
version at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 27.001–.011).
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2. Increasing the number of exemptions;
3. Broadening protections for the media, consumer review platforms,
domestic violence, and sexual assault survivors; and
4. Changing the procedures for resolving motions to dismiss.
Enacted in 2011, the TCPA is an “anti-SLAPP” statute—a species of law
currently found in thirty-one states.7 “SLAPP” stands for “strategic lawsuits
against public participation.”8 This Article provides a brief overview of the
wide variety of state anti-SLAPP statutes and how they are typically intended
to work.9 The authors also discuss some concerns with the original TCPA
by describing significant cases which led to the demand for legislation.
With respect to Texas’s 2019 changes, this Article will cover the statute’s
legislative history, including how legislators and stakeholders contributed to
those changes.
Two areas of change will receive substantial additional focus: (1) the
narrowing effects of key definitions, especially the origin and meaning of
“matter of public concern,” perhaps the most debated and controversial
change;10 and (2) broad protections for the media. We specifically focus on
these two areas so lawyers will understand what informed the legislative

7. See Melissa Wasser, Virginia Legislators Pass Bills Aimed at Dismissing Frivolous Lawsuits Restricting
First Amendment Rights, REPS. COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM PRESS, (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.rcfp.
org/virginia-anti-slapp-bills-analysis/ [https://perma.cc/G44K-FAYR] (“Thirty-one jurisdictions
across the United States currently have some form of anti-SLAPP protections.”).
8. Understanding Anti-SLAPP Laws, REPS. COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM PRESS, https://www.
rcfp.org/resources/anti-slapp-laws/ [https://perma.cc/HY5Q-8YJS].
9. There is no federal anti-SLAPP statute or rule, although bills have been filed in the United
States Congress to implement one. See, e.g., H.R. 2304, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015) (proposing the
creation of a “special motion to dismiss” to counter SLAPP suits).
10. See Rick Blum, New Legislation Would Imperil Texas Anti-SLAPP Law, REPS. COMMITTEE FOR
FREEDOM PRESS (Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.rcfp.org/new-legislation-would-imperil-texas-antislapp-law/ [https://perma.cc/C7Y7-P7VP] (suggesting new anti-SLAPP amendments would remove
the “clear protection[s]” provided by the TCPA). Justice Fields for the Austin Court of Appeals
expanded further:
But the Legislature did not stop there—it further defined a ‘matter of public concern’ to include
‘economic’ or ‘community well-being’ or a ‘service in the marketplace.’ Such broad terms have
forced courts, like the majority here, to conclude that disputes between an HOA and its property
manager involve the right to free speech because it is relevant to ‘economic’ or ‘community wellbeing.’ It is difficult to reconcile such a conclusion with the stated purposes of the TCPA.
Neyland v. Thompson, No. 03-13-00643-CV, 2015 WL 1612155, at *12 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 7,
2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (Field, J., concurring).
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changes to the “public concern” definition when litigating a TCPA motion
and the reasons for expressly protecting the media—often the targets of
SLAPP suits.
Finally, the Article will address new exemptions to the application of the
TCPA, the operation of several “exceptions-to-exemptions,” and
procedural changes which will affect how TCPA motions to dismiss are
resolved.
II. ANTI-SLAPP STATUTES AND HOW THEY TYPICALLY WORK
SLAPP lawsuits began receiving attention from legal scholars in the 1980s
based on a study which determined SLAPP lawsuits were becoming more
commonly used by large corporations and deep-pocketed plaintiffs to
silence their critics.11 The rise in SLAPP lawsuits likely stemmed from the
significant increase in political activism in the 1960s and 1970s.12
According to the study,13 the solution to curbing these types of lawsuits was
for a defendant—who was being sued for speaking out against the
plaintiff—to invoke her First Amendment “[right] to petition”14 in these
types of cases.15 This strategy allowed debates about issues of public
concern to continue in the public realm rather than in a courtroom.16 The
concept gave birth to the first anti-SLAPP statute in 1989; many other states
followed.17
A couple of examples may prove helpful to better understand the
circumstances in which the use of an anti-SLAPP statute is appropriate.
11. See Penelope Canan & George W. Pring, Studying Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation:
Mixing Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 385, 386 (1988) [hereinafter Canan
& Pring, Mixing Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches] (finding SLAPP suits are a “political-legal
phenomenon” deterring citizen participation).
12. See generally Landon A. Wade, Comment, The Texas Citizen’s Participation Act: A Safe Haven for
Media Defendants and Big Business, and a SLAPP in the Face for Plaintiffs with Legitimate Causes of Action,
47 TEX. TECH L. REV. ONLINE EDITION 69, 73 (2014) (describing how SLAPP lawsuits were
uncommon until political activism surged in popularity); Tom Wyrwich, Comment, A Cure for a “Public
Concern”: Washington’s New Anti-SLAPP Law, 86 WASH. L. REV. 663, 666 (2011).
13. See generally Canan & Pring, Mixing Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches, supra note 11; see also
Penelope Canan & George W. Pring, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 35 SOC. PROBS. 506
(1988) [hereinafter Canan & Pring, Strategic Lawsuits].
14. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
15. See generally Canan & Pring, Mixing Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches, supra note 11; Canan
& Pring, Strategic Lawsuits, supra note 13.
16. Wade, supra note 12, at 72.
17. See generally Anti-SLAPP Statutes and Commentary, MEDIALAW, https://www.medialaw.org/
topics-page/anti-slapp?tmpl=component&print=1
[https://perma.cc/TD3J-DHUB]
(offering
commentary and history of SLAPPs in the United States).
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Suppose a neighborhood association disagrees with a city over whether a
gas station’s design meets community building standards and files a routine
appeal to stop the station’s development. Enraged, the developer sues the
neighborhood association and its members, individually, for defamation.
The developer has the financial ability to sustain protracted litigation.
Realizing this, the neighborhood association drops its appeal, unable to
sustain emotional and financial costs associated with prolonged litigation,
even if they would have ultimately prevailed in court.18
Another example involves a well-known comedian who criticized a
privately-owned coal company and its owner after a mine collapsed, killing
nine people. On the comedian’s television show, he referred to a
government report which concluded the collapse occurred because of
unauthorized mining practices. He also noted the coal company’s owner
claimed an earthquake caused the accident.19 In his caustic criticism, the
comedian made derogatory remarks about the owner’s physical appearance
and age. Humiliated and angered by the comedian’s remarks, the owner
sued the comedian and the television network for defamation, false light,
invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, stating
“[d]efendants childishly demeaned and disparaged [plaintiff] and his
companies, made jokes about [plaintiff’s] age, health, and appearance . . . all
before a worldwide audience . . . .”20 Although the comedian and the
network eventually prevailed in court, the lawsuit was filed in a state without
an anti-SLAPP statute, which the judge noted with disappointment during
the disposition of the case.21
“The goal of SLAPP [suit] filers,” like the gas station developer and the
coal company owner in our examples, is to silence the opposition by

18. Michael Barajas, Can Developers Sue You Because You Don’t Like Their Development? (July 26,
2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.sacurrent.com/the-daily/archives/2016/07/26/can-developers-sueyou-because-you-dont-like-their-development [https://perma.cc/WBB2-Y9EY].
19. Betsy Swan, Republican Coal King Sues HBO Over John Oliver’s Show, DAILY BEAST, (July 22,
2017, 5:18 PM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/coal-king-sues-hbo-over-john-olivers-show
[https://perma.cc/7KZK-LTHR].
20. Complaint at 2, Marshall Cty. Coal Co. v. John Oliver, No. 17-C-124, 2018 WL 1082525,
at *2 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. Feb. 22, 2018).
21. See Adrian Horton, John Oliver Takes On Muzzling Lawsuits—and the Man Who Sued His Show,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 11, 2019, 12:08 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/culture/2019/nov/11/johnoliver-last-week-tonight-lawsuits-murray-energy [https://perma.cc/58EW-65W7] (describing details
of a SLAPP suit involving John Oliver).
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dragging defendants through expensive litigation until they surrender their
right to comment on issues important to the public.22
Generally, anti-SLAPP laws provide the following: (1) a procedure for
protection against lawsuits targeting someone who communicates about
matters of public concern;23 (2) rules to promptly (and hopefully,
inexpensively) resolve such claims;24 (3) a right of immediate appeal of a
ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion;25 and, (4) attorney’s fees and other costs
to be paid to a party who files the successful anti-SLAPP motion.26 The
heart of any effective anti-SLAPP statute is a provision authorizing a motion
to dismiss early in a case, such as the clause present in the Texas law.27 This
method allows a defendant (the “movant” or party who filed the motion to
dismiss) to force the hand of the plaintiff (or “nonmovant”) early in a suit,
staying all other action in the case until the motion is resolved. The
underlying benefit is to reduce or avoid litigation costs if the motion prevails
and the suit is dismissed.
State anti-SLAPP laws vary from being very broad to very narrow. For
example, Delaware, Maryland, Maine, Nebraska, New York, and Utah are
all recognized as having anti-SLAPP laws but do not require attorney’s fees
to be paid to a successful movant of a motion to dismiss.28
In thirteen states, the statutes protect only certain types of public
concern.29 Some states only allow a defendant who is “a public applicant
or permittee” to bring an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss.30 Others have
22. Wade, supra note 12, at 71; Wyrwich, supra note 12, at 666.
23. Wetmore v. Bresnen, No. 03-18-00467-CV, 2019 WL 6885031, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin
Dec. 18, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The TCPA provides a procedure for expeditiously dismissing a
nonmeritorious ‘legal action’ that is ‘based on, relates to, or is in response’ to the moving party’s
exercise of three statutorily defined rights: the right of association, the right of free speech, and the
right to petition (the TCPA Rights).” (quoting Hersh v. Tatum, 526 S.W.3d 462, 463 (Tex. 2017))).
24. See Anti-SLAPP Statutes and Commentary, supra note 17 (“Anti-SLAPP statutes were proposed
to provide a quick, effective and inexpensive mechanism to combat such suits.”).
25. See id. (describing several state anti-SLAPP laws which provide for an immediate appeal).
26. See generally id. (discussing the model anti-SLAPP law’s inclusion of attorney’s fees and other
costs).
27. See Wasser, supra note 7 (discussing Virginia’s failure to include a clause providing for early
motions to dismiss, which would have made the anti-SLAPP statute more effective); see also TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.003 (describing procedures for filing a motion to dismiss in an antiSLAPP suit).
28. State Anti-SLAPP Laws, PUB. PARTICIPATION PROJECT: FIGHTING FOR FREE SPEECH,
https://anti-slapp.org/your-states-free-speech-protection#reference-chart [https://perma.cc/5L3XDRGT].
29. Id.
30. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8136 (2018).
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narrowed the scope of anti-SLAPP motions to situations involving
“permit[s], zoning change[s], leas[ing], [and] licens[ing].”31 Pennsylvania
limits its anti-SLAPP law to suits involving “enforcement of environmental
law[s] and regulation.”32 In Hawaii, protected activity is defined as “any
oral or written testimony submitted or provided to a governmental body
during the course of a governmental proceeding.”33 Arizona’s law is also
restricted to governmental proceedings but expands its applicability to
include communication “[m]ade for the purpose of influencing a
governmental action, decision or result.”34
On the other end of the spectrum, California’s anti-SLAPP statute is
broad, as are both the original and revised Texas statutes; however, the new
Texas law’s expressed protection for media defendants is broader than
either California’s or the old Texas law.35 Both states’ statutes apply to
public and private communication for media and non-media defendants.36
Kansas and Oklahoma arguably have the broadest statutes (Oklahoma37
enacted the old Texas statute, in its entirety), especially pertaining to what
constitutes a matter of public concern, which likely includes private
matters.38
When the original proponents of the Texas anti-SLAPP law petitioned
the Legislature in 2011 to enact the original TCPA, they noted the law
“would allow frivolous lawsuits to be dismissed at the outset of the
proceeding, promoting the constitutional rights of citizens and helping to

31. Id.; NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21, 242 (2018).
32. 27 PA. STAT. & CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8301 (2018).
33. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 634F-1 (2018).
34. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-751 (2018).
35. See generally CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (“To this end, this section shall be construed
broadly.”); cf. Act of June 17, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 341, § 2, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 961 (amended
2019).
36. See Tamkin v. CBS Broad., Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 264, 273–74 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011)
(concluding a script containing allegedly defamatory speech was not publicly disseminated); see also
Lippincott v. Whisenhunt, 462 S.W.3d 507, 509 (Tex. 2015) (interpreting the Texas anti-SLAPP statute
to both public and private communications).
37. See generally Aaron F. W. Meek & Noah E. W. Meek, The Oklahoma Citizens Participation Act
as a General Early Dismissal Procedure, 90 OKLA. B.J. 32 (2019) (explaining the history and application of
anti-SLAPP legislation in the State of Oklahoma).
38. See W. Gary Fowler, A Slap at Employment Law? A Look at the Impact of Texas Citizens
Participation Act in 2017, JW|JACKSON WALKER (Dec. 17, 2017), https://www.jw.com/news/a-slapat-employment-law-a-look-at-the-impact-of-texas-citizens-participation-act-in-2017/ [https://perma.
cc/Z5V9-KT97] (discussing a Texas case in which the court recognized the TCPA’s broader coverage
over the matters of public concern).
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alleviate some of the burden on the court system.”39 Early dismissal was
an especially noble goal considering the primary mechanism by which such
lawsuits could be dismissed before the TCPA’s enactment was summary
judgment. Often, summary judgment is obtained “only after a lengthy and
costly discovery process.”40 But in the eight years since enactment, the
TCPA revealed one unintended consequence of its broad language was to
essentially close the courthouse doors to Texas litigants with righteous
claims.41
III. HOW THE TCPA WENT WRONG AND WHY REFORM WAS NEEDED
While the TCPA states its purpose is to “encourage and safeguard . . .
constitutional rights,”42 the Texas Supreme Court and various Courts of
Appeals held the old TCPA was considerably broader than the protection
of constitutional rights.43 The old TCPA’s broad definitions of the “rights
of free speech and association” and “legal action” led to its application in
unanticipated cases, including family law,44 probate,45 trade secret
protection,46 and State Bar of Texas enforcement actions.47 Even more
39. House Research Org., Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 2973, 82d Leg., R.S. (2011) (emphasis added).
40. The Texas Anti-SLAPP Statute: An Effective Statute, but Is It Too Broad?, TEXANS FOR LAWSUIT
REFORM FOUND. 1 (Dec. 2018), http://www.tlrfoundation.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/
TLR_SLAPP_Foundation_Paper_12.2018_V01.pdf [https://perma.cc/U7JD-NZM5] [hereinafter
The Texas Anti-SLAPP Statute].
41. Amanda G. Taylor, 2018 Anti-SLAPP Update, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, 35TH ANNUAL
LITIGATION UPDATE INSTITUTE 2 (2019) (“Without question, the TCPA continues to favor movants.
Approximately 61% of the cases were decided in favor of movants in 2018.”).
42. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.002.
43. Youngkin v. Hines, 546 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. 2018); Adams v. Starside Custom Builders,
LLC, 547 S.W.3d 890, 894 (Tex. 2018); Abatecola v. 2 Savages Concrete Pumping, LLC, No. 14-1700678-CV, 2018 WL 3118601, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 26, 2018, pet. denied)
(mem. op.); Price v. Buschemeyer, No. 12-17-00180-CV, 2018 WL 1569856, at *2 (Tex. App.—Tyler
Mar. 29, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.); Collins v. Collins, No. 01-17-00817-CV, 2018 WL 1320841,
at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 15, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
44. See, e.g., Smith v. Malone, No. 05-18-00216-CV, 2018 WL 6187639, at *1 (Tex. App.—
Dallas Nov. 27, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (applying the TCPA where the plaintiff claimed the
defendant sued her in retaliation to her seeking child support).
45. See, e.g., Collins, 2018 WL 1320841, at *2 (applying the TCPA in a probate dispute even where
a divorce dispute involved a private matter).
46. See, e.g., Elite Auto Body LLC v. Autocraft Bodywerks, Inc., 520 S.W.3d 191, 193 (Tex.
App—Austin 2017, pet. dism’d) (employing the TCPA to “defend against claims seeking to remedy
alleged misappropriation or misuse of a business’ trade secrets or confidential information”).
47. See, e.g., Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline v. Rosales, 577 S.W.3d 305, 311 (Tex. App.—Austin
2019, pet. denied) (concluding the Commission on Lawyer Discipline “is not exempt from the TCPA
under the plain language of subsection 27.010(a)”).
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consequential—these definitions, coupled with the statute’s previous
definition of “public concern,” made the statute one of the most litigated in
recent Texas history.48
From April 2018 until April 2019, the Office of Court Administration
reported 99,300 filed documents referenced the TCPA.49 For comparison,
there were only about 305,400 documents filed referencing summary
judgment during the same one year period.50 From 2011 through 2019,
there were 407 appellate court opinions interpreting the TCPA.51
Moreover, the number of appellate opinions dramatically escalated with
each passing year after the TCPA’s inception—with only 4 opinions in 2012,
21 opinions in 2013, 25 opinions in 2014, 40 opinions in 2015, 55 opinions
in 2016, 47 opinions in 2017, 94 opinions in 2018, and 121 opinions in
2019.52 The Texas Supreme Court issued eight opinions in the first six
months of 2018 alone.53 According to a staff attorney at the Fifth Court of
Appeals in Dallas, over 40% of cases on the court’s docket were TCPA
cases.54
Judges at all levels throughout the state expressed discontent with the
breadth of the TCPA.55 Very pointed pleas were made to the Legislature

48. See Cavin v. Abbott, 545 S.W.3d 47, 49 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, no pet.) (“This case
illustrates that the [TCPA] as written—and, therefore, as the Texas Judiciary must apply it—can be
invoked successfully in the context of litigation arising from family tumult over an adult daughter’s
choice of a husband.”); see also Neyland v. Thompson, No. 03-13-00643-CV, 2015 WL 1612155, at *12
(Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 7, 2015, no pet.) (Field, J., concurring) (mem. op.) (“It seems that any skilled
litigator could figure out a way to file a motion to dismiss under the TCPA in nearly every case, in the
hope that the case will not only be dismissed, but that the movant will also be awarded attorneys’
fees.”); The Texas Anti-SLAPP Statute, supra note 40, at 18. (“Because courts have interpreted the TCPA
so broadly, it is being used in litigation of all varieties. The numerous appeals in TCPA cases
demonstrate that Texas’s appellate courts are expending significant time reviewing and ruling on issues
raised by the TCPA.”).
49. Briefing Document: H.B. 2730 (Engrossed), Tex. H.B. 2730, 86th Leg., R.S. (2019) (on file
with authors) [hereinafter H.B. 2730 Briefing Doc.].
50. Email from Megan LaVoie, Dir. of Public Affairs & Special Counsel, Office of Court
Administration, to Steve Bresnen (Apr. 9, 2019, 3:31:43 PM) (on file with authors).
51. Mark C. Walker, The Essential Guide to the Texas Anti-SLAPP Law, The Texas Defamation
Mitigation Act, and Rule 91a, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, 36TH ANNUAL LITIGATION INSTITUTE 1 (2020).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. H.B. 2730 Briefing Doc., supra note 49.
55. See In re SSCP Mgmt., Inc., 573 S.W.3d 464, 466 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2019, no pet.)
(“‘It’s déjà vu all over again’ as this court journeys on its latest foray through the ever evolving battlefields
of the [TCPA].’” (quoting YOGI BERRA, THE YOGI BOOK: I REALLY DIDN’T SAY EVERYTHING I
SAID! (1999))).
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to reign in the statute.56 The Texas Supreme Court was repeatedly invited
to narrow its interpretation of the law, resulting in some very interesting
opinions.57 Judges, lawyers, and litigants all yearned for change.
Although the purpose of the TCPA was to protect a movant’s
constitutional rights, as originally drafted, it could be unusually draconian to
a nonmovant.58 When a movant filed the motion to dismiss, discovery in the
case was suspended until the trial court ruled on the motion, unless “the
court . . . allow[ed] specified and limited discovery relevant to the
motion.”59 Also, the nonmovant’s case could be tied up for years because
the movant is authorized to file interlocutory appeals of a denial of a motion
to dismiss.60
Under the old law,61 the statute required a three-step decisional process
in an abbreviated timeframe. As a result:
1. The first step in resolving the motion under the prior statute required
the trial court to dismiss an action “if the moving party shows by a
56. See Serafine v. Blunt, 466 S.W.3d 352, 394–95 (Tex. App.—Austin 2015, no pet.) (“Even
better, I would hope that the Texas Legislature might be listening, because it could provide, by
amending the TCPA, the clearest and most direct expression of any legislative intent that has been
eluding the Judicial Branch.”); see also Universal Plant Servs., Inc. v. Dresser-Rand Grp., Inc.,
571 S.W.3d 346, 365 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (Keyes, J., concurring to her own
majority opinion) (expressing concern with how expansively the statute has been interpreted, urging it
“be brought back into compliance with the rules of statutory construction”); Gaskamp v. WSP USA,
Inc., No. 01-18-00079-CV, 2018 WL 6695810, at *13–16 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 20,
2018) withdrawn and superseded on reconsideration en banc, 596 S.W.3d 457 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2020, pet. filed) (Jennings, J., concurring and dissenting) (contending the Supreme Court has gone too
far in its broad interpretation of the TCPA, and urging the legislature to repeal or amend it).
57. See, e.g., Universal Plant Servs., Inc., 571 S.W.3d at 371 (Keyes, J., concurring to her own
majority opinion) (requesting “the Texas Supreme Court make it clear” when a TCPA motion may be
denied).
58. Kawcak v. Antero Res. Corp., 582 S.W.3d 566, 569 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2019, pet.
denied) (“No one can doubt the power of the TCPA to rock a claimant back on its heels. Once in the
grip of the TCPA, a party may stairstep down increasingly dire consequences that most litigants do not
have to face: [1] All discovery is suspended until the trial court rules[,] . . . [2] in an abbreviated time
frame, the party bringing the claim must establish a prima facie case for each of its essential elements
with clear and specific evidence . . . [3] the parties may file an interlocutory appeal . . . [4] a final result
that may be an order of the trial or appellate court that dismisses the action, bringing the consequences
of not only paying the party’s fees . . . but also . . . court costs, reasonable attorney’s fees, and expenses
incurred by the party’s opponent and an award of sanctions.”).
59. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.006(b).
60. Id. § 27.008(b); see also Kawcak, 582 S.W.3d at 569 (stating the ability to file interlocutory
appeals is an “increasingly dire consequence[]” unique to TCPA cases).
61. Much of this process was not affected by the 2019 amendments. See infra Part VII for
changes.
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preponderance of the evidence that the legal action is based on,
relates to, or is in response to the party’s exercise of . . . the right of
free speech [or] the right to petition.”62 (The same procedure applies
in cases in which the right of association is at issue.)
2. Under the second step, the court may not dismiss the action if the
non-moving party “establishe[d] by clear and specific evidence a
prima facie case for each essential element of the claim in
question.”63
3. Third, the movant could still prevail if she established “by a
preponderance of the evidence each essential element of a valid
defense to the nonmovant’s claim.”64
The parties could appeal if not satisfied with the trial court’s ruling. A
movant’s interlocutory appeal of a denial extended the time during which
discovery was suspended.65 A final decision dismissing the claimant or
nonmovant’s action resulted in the nonmovant paying her own expenses
and the movant’s attorney’s fees and sanctions, both of which were
62. Creative Oil & Gas, LLC v. Lona Hills Ranch, LLC, 591 S.W.3d 127, 132 (Tex. 2019); Act
of June 17, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 341, § 2, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 961 (amended 2019).
63. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.005(c); Creative Oil & Gas, LLC, 591 S.W.3d at 132; see Baumgart
v. Archer, 581 S.W.3d 819, 831 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. denied) (holding
nonmovant failed to meet his burden to establish clear and specific evidence of a prima facie case for
each essential element of his claim); Mazaheri v. Tola, No. 05-18-01367-CV, 2019 WL 3451188, at *2
(Tex. App.—Dallas July 31, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“The TCPA does not define the phrase
‘clear and specific evidence,’ but the supreme court has held the standard requires more than mere
notice pleadings and a plaintiff ‘must provide enough detail to show the factual basis for its claim.’”
(quoting In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 591 (Tex. 2015))); In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 590 (“[A prima
facie case] refers to evidence sufficient as a matter of law to establish a given fact if it is not rebutted
or contradicted. It is the ‘minimum quantum of evidence necessary to support a rational inference that
the allegation of fact is true.’” (quoting In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 136 S.W.3d 218, 223
(Tex. 2004))); see also In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 590 (“The TCPA’s direction that a claim should not
be dismissed ‘if the party bringing the legal action establishes by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case
for each essential element of the claim in question’ thus describes the clarity and detail required to
avoid dismissal.” (quoting CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.005(c))); Bass v. United Dev. Funding, L.P., No. 0518-00752-CV, 2019 WL 3940976, at *16 (Ct. App.—Dallas Aug. 21, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.)
(stating the burden of proof for a prima facia TCPA case); cf. Neurodiagnostic Consultants, LLC v.
Nallia, No. 03-18-00609-CV, 2019 WL 4231232, at *12 (Tex. App.—Austin Sept. 6, 2019, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (holding the plaintiff met its burden to establish by clear and specific evidence its claims
for civil conspiracy, breach of fiduciary duty, and misappropriation of trade secrets).
64. Creative Oil & Gas, 591 S.W.3d at 132; Act of June 14, 2013, 83d Leg., R.S., ch. 1042, § 2,
2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 2499 (amended 2019) (current version at CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.005).
65. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 51.014(a)(12).
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mandatory.66 However, if the nonmovant prevailed against a motion to
dismiss, she could only be awarded attorney’s fees if the movant’s motion
to dismiss was found to be frivolous or solely intended to delay.67
Although Texas litigants should be able to pursue valid claims in court,
this right should not interfere with constitutional rights under the First
Amendment. There are few things more sacred to Americans than
preserving the right to engage in discourse on matters of public concern.
But, the lop-sided risks—coupled with the statute’s potential to endlessly
prolong suits—made it imperative for the Legislature, given the underlying
purpose of the statute, to narrow the statute’s applicability thoughtfully and
carefully.
Much of the statute’s extraordinary reach resulted from the disconnect
between the TCPA’s stated purpose of protecting constitutional rights and
the actual wording of the old TCPA’s definitions. The broad definitions led
the courts to apply it more broadly than traditional First Amendment
protections.68 Under the old motion to dismiss provision, the statute read:
“If a legal action is based on, relates to, or is in response to a party’s exercise
of the right of free speech, right to petition, or right of association, that party
may file a motion to dismiss the legal action.”69 Arguably, the “rights”
referred to were intended to mean the constitutional rights addressed by the
chapter’s purpose provision.70 But the statute went further in its
definitions, extending the reach of the TCPA well beyond First Amendment
jurisprudence.71

66. See Sullivan v. Abraham, 472 S.W.3d 677, 681–82 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2014), rev’d on other
grounds, 488 S.W.3d 294 (Tex. 2016) (emphasizing “fees and expenses must be awarded”).
67. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.009(b); see Taylor, supra note 41, at 21 (“Aside from one opinion
affirming such an award based on waiver, the author is not aware of any opinion affirming an award
under section 27.009(b) on its merits.”).
68. See Adams v. Starside Custom Builders, LLC, 547 S.W.3d 890, 892 (Tex. 2018) (“The TCPA
provides its own definition of ‘exercise of the right of free speech.’ The statutory definition is not fully
coextensive with the constitutional free-speech right protected by the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Texas Constitution.” (quoting CIV. PRAC. & REM.
§ 27.003(a))).
69. Act of June 17, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 341, § 2, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 961 (amended 2019).
70. See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.002 (referring to constitutional rights).
71. Zach Wolfe, A SLAPP in the Face to Texas Trade Secrets Lawsuits—Part 2, FIVE MINUTE L.
(June 12, 2017), https://fiveminutelaw.com/2017/06/12/slapp-in-the-face-to-texas-trade-secretslawsuits-part-2/ [https://perma.cc/KL9V-8U5R].
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Three specific definitions in the prior statute—and a general provision
directing courts to construe the chapter liberally72—led courts to extend the
statute’s application beyond its purpose provision: (1) the right of
association; (2) legal action; and (3) matter of public concern. With the
confluence of these four provisions of the old law, a Texas-sized litigation
epidemic was born.
The next part of this Article addresses each of these prior definitions,
juxtaposed with the new definitions, to show how the Legislature targeted
each of them to better serve the TCPA’s original purposes.
IV. NARROWING KEY DEFINITIONS
A. Reducing the Sweep of “Right of Association”
The old law:
“‘Exercise of the right of association’ means a communication between
individuals who join together to collectively express, promote, pursue,
or defend common interests.”73
The new law:
“Exercise of the right of association” means to join together to
collectively express, promote, pursue, or defend common interests
relating to a governmental proceeding or a matter of public concern.74
The old definition did not require the exercise of association rights
involve a governmental proceeding or a matter of public concern, the
absence of which had the effect of extending its reach well beyond First
Amendment constitutional rights.75 By adding the language requiring one
of two additional elements—using the disjunctive “or”—the Legislature
72. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.011(b); see also Kawcak v. Antero Res. Corp., 582 S.W.3d 566, 575
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2019, pet. denied) (“Exacerbating our challenge is the TCPA’s directive that
it ‘shall be construed liberally to effectuate its purpose and intent fully.’” (quoting CIV. PRAC. & REM.
§ 27.011(b))).
73. Act of June 17, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 341, § 2, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 961 (amended 2019).
74. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.001(2) (emphasis added).
75. Compare Act of June 17, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 341, § 2, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 961
(amended 2019) (referring to “common interests,” but not public concern), with CIV. PRAC. & REM.
§ 27.001(2) (containing new language “relating to a governmental proceeding or a matter of public
concern”).
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limited the definition’s reach to more traditional anti-SLAPP functions: the
former protecting public participation in governmental processes, and the
latter protecting the free speech concerns addressed under the new
definition of a matter of public concern.76 The new definition of public
concern is addressed in Part IV-C of this Article.
The term “common interests” was undefined under the old law and
effectively unlimited. This led some courts to hold disputes alleging
misappropriation of trade secrets and violations of employment-related
agreements—such as enforcement of covenants not to compete—
constituted “pursuing common interests,”77 because those cases inevitably
involved people alleged to be engaging in such conduct at the expense of
someone else.
In Elite Autobody LLC v. Autocraft Bodywerks, Inc.,78 a trade secrets dispute
between two auto repair businesses, the Third Court of Appeals in Austin
rejected the argument the TCPA did not apply between two alleged
tortfeasors in violation of the Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act.79 In doing
so, the court asserted the “communications” at the heart of the issue fell
within the definition of “communications” in the TCPA and the
communications were “between individuals who join together to
collectively . . . promote, pursue, or defend common interests.”80 Similarly,
in Craig v. Tejas Promotions, LLC,81 the plaintiff (Tejas) sued the defendant
(Craig)—a would-be customer—for alleged trade secret violations. Craig
was able to persuade the court the TCPA applied because the customers

76. See infra Part IV-C.
77. See Elite Auto Body LLC v. Autocraft Bodywerks, Inc., 520 S.W.3d 191, 204 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2017, pet dism’d) (“And in Coleman’s wake, we must reject [the nonmovant’s] attempts to limit
TCPA ‘communications’ solely to those the First Amendment protects.”); see also Schlumberger Ltd. v.
Rutherford, 472 S.W.3d 881, 895 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015) (holding the breach-ofcontract claim was subject to dismissal under the TCPA, but nonmovant had met its burden under the
Act’s burden shifting provisions for the subject claim); Morgan v. Clements Fluids S. Tex., Ltd.,
589 S.W.3d 177, 185 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2018, no pet.) (deciding an employer’s action against three
former employees for misappropriation of trade secrets was based on the employees’ communications
amongst themselves and others within the employer’s competitors; therefore, the action responded to
their exercise of a right under the TCPA).
78. Elite Auto Body LLC v. Autocraft Bodywerks, Inc., 520 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. App.—Austin
2017, pet dism’d).
79. See generally id. (stating the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA) “can potentially be
invoked successfully to defend against claims seeking to remedy alleged misappropriation or misuse of
a business’s trade secrets or confidential information.”) (footnote omitted).
80. Id.
81. Craig v. Tejas Promotions, LLC, 550 S.W.3d 287 (Tex. App.—Austin 2018, pet. denied).
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were exercising their right of association—even if this association involved
misappropriating the company’s trade secrets.82 The Fourteenth Court of
Appeals in Houston also interpreted the definition broadly in holding the
TCPA’s “right of association” applied to certain tortious interference claims
involving a covenant not to compete.83
But, in early 2019, just as the Legislature prepared to consider
amendments to the old definition, the winds began to change in the North
Texas courts. Both the Fifth Court of Appeals in Dallas and the Second
Court of Appeals in Fort Worth separately refused to follow Elite AutoBody
and its progeny by holding the plain language of the old definition of “right
of association” did in fact require some kind of public participation and not
just a mere agreement between two parties who claim to be “associated.”84
Interestingly, one of these opinions was issued on the legislative bill filing
deadline day, and all five filed bills proposing to amend the TCPA amended
the definition of “right of association.”85 Whether the courts were paying
attention to the TCPA legislative bill filings—or whether this was merely a
coincidence—is unknown.
In Kawcak v. Antero Resources Corp.,86 the Second Court of Appeals in Fort
Worth refused to apply the TCPA motion to dismiss in a suit involving a
“kickback scheme” allegedly costing the plaintiff company hundreds of
millions of dollars.87 In a matter of first impression, the court interpreted
the word “common” in the old definition of the “right of association” under
its plain meaning, asserting the term required more than two tortfeasors
conspiring to act tortiously for their own selfish benefit. “Because Kawcak
acknowledge[d] that his invocation of the TCPA assumes a definition of

82. Id.; The Texas Anti-SLAPP Statute, supra note 40.
83. See generally Abatecola v. 2 Savages Concrete Pumping, LLC, No. 14-17-00678-CV, 2018 WL
3118601, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 26, 2018, pet denied) (mem. op.) (concluding
the commercial speech exemption in the TCPA did apply to tortious interference claims based on
contact with customers but did not apply to tortious interference claims based on allegedly inducing
violations of a restrictive covenant).
84. See Kawcak v. Antero Res. Corp., 582 S.W.3d 566, 579 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2019, pet.
denied) (“To give the word ‘common’ a definition that embraces the actions of only two tortfeasors
would make the right of association an outlier in this TCPA scheme.”); Dyer v. Medoc Health Servs.,
LLC, 573 S.W.3d 418, 427 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2019, pet. denied).
85. See Tex. H.B. 2730, 86th Leg., R.S. (2019); Tex. H.B. 3547, 86th Leg., R.S. (2019); Tex.
H.B. 4575, 86th Leg., R.S. (2019); Tex. S.B. 2162, 86th Leg., R.S. (2019).
86. Kawcak v. Antero Res. Corp., 582 S.W.3d 566 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2019, pet. denied).
87. Id. at 569–70.
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‘common’ at odds with our holding,” the court concluded the TCPA did
not apply to this lawsuit.88 Analyzing the definition, the court reasoned:
[I]t establishes a point where two roads of TCPA interpretation diverge. One
road assigns meaning to the word ‘common’ that embraces a set of only two
people and triggers the TCPA in almost any case of conspiracy. The other
road reads ‘common’ to embrace a larger set defined by the public or at least
a group. In our view, a plain-meaning interpretation of the TCPA supports
the second definition.89

The court explained in great detail why its construction of the word
“common” was not in conflict with the plain meaning of the word or with
the intended use under the definition of “right of association.”90
In Dyer v. Medoc Health Services, LLC,91 the Fifth Court of Appeals
concluded a conspiracy between tortfeasors—who claimed they had a right
to associate with each other to pursue a “common interest” by allegedly
misappropriating the plaintiff’s proprietary software and confidential
business information—did not fall under the statute’s old definition and
affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. In doing so, the
court asserted that to allow such an interpretation would be an absurd result
and “would not further the purpose of . . . curb[ing] strategic lawsuits
against public participation. . . . .”92 At least systematically, this court
followed its precedent of narrowing the definition of “right of association”
to include either public or citizen participation.93
88. Id. at 588.
89. Id. at 573.
90. Id.
91. Dyer v. Medoc Health Servs., LLC, 573 S.W.3d 418 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2019, pet denied).
92. Id.
93. See Perlman v. EKLS Firestopping & Constr., LLC, No. 05-18-00971-CV, 2019 WL
2710752, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 28, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding a breach of contract
claim did not relate to the exercise of free speech, the exercise of right of association, or involved public
or citizen participation); see also Reed v. Centurion Terminals, LLC, No. 05-18-01171-CV, 2019 WL
2865281, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 3, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“This court has already held
that the TCPA’s definition of the right of association does not apply to private communications that
did not involve any public or citizen’s participation.”); Noble Anesthesia Partners, PLLC v. U.S.
Anesthesia Partners, Inc., No. 05-18-00768-CV, 2019 WL 3212137, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 9,
2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (concluding the surgeon’s group made “no showing that [the employees]
were individuals who ‘joined together to collectively express, promote, pursue, or defend common
interests.’” (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN § 27.001(2))); Damonte v. Hallmark Fin.
Servs. Inc, No. 05-18-00874-CV, 2019 WL 3059884, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 12, 2019, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (deciding the claims based on communications among alleged tortfeasors to misappropriate

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2021

17

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 52 [2021], No. 1, Art. 3

70

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52:53

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals in Houston also began to narrow the
definition of “right of association” by concluding the TCPA did not cover
a conspiracy to commit theft or conversion.94 In contrast, the Third Court
of Appeals in Austin and the Ninth Court of Appeals in Beaumont applied
the old definition of “right of association” to misappropriation of trade
secret claims, but determined the commercial speech exemption95 also
applied to the claims and so affirmed the lower courts’ denial of the TCPA
motion.96
The conflict between the state appellate courts highlighted the need to
give thoughtful consideration to the “right of association” definition. After
much negotiation amongst the stakeholders, the new definition expressly
requires the communication at issue relate to a governmental proceeding or
a matter of public concern. Notably, neither the new nor prior definition
restricts the communication to being spoken or written. The absence of
such limiting language allows the definition to be applied to expressive
conduct—an observation buttressed by the actual verbiage authorizing the
motion to dismiss—only requiring the movant to have “exercised” the right
of association for the statute to apply.97 Notably, there may be significant
overlap between the definition of the right to petition, which is closely tied
confidential and proprietary information were not communications protected by the right of
association under the TCPA); Shields v. Shields, No. 05-18-01539-CV, 2019 WL 4071997, at *7 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Aug. 29, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“[W]e have repeatedly held that a movant must
demonstrate that the communication involved public or citizen’s participation.”); Rouzier v. BioTE
Med., LLC, No. 05-19-00277-CV, 2019 WL 6242305, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 22, 2019, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (explaining “[d]iscussions among alleged tortfeasors to misappropriate confidential and
proprietary information are not communications” protected under the statute’s definition of right of
association); Goldberg v. EMR (USA Holdings) Inc., 594 S.W.3d 818, 833 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2020,
pet. denied) (stating defendants “failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiffs’
claims [were] based on, relate[d] to, or [were] in response to Defendants’ exercise of the right of
association or free speech” in a breach of contract and various commercial tort actions).
94. Bandin v. Free & Sovereign State of Veracruz de Ignacio de la Llave, 590 S.W.3d 647, 652
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. filed) (“Our court has not addressed whether the TCPA
covers a conspiracy to commit theft or conversion; neither has the Supreme Court of Texas. We
conclude that the TCPA does not extend so far.”).
95. Act of June 17, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 341, § 2, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 961 (amended 2019).
96. See Rose v. Sci. Mach. & Welding, Inc., No. 03-18-00721-CV, 2019 WL 2588512, at *5 (Tex.
App.—Austin June 25, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (finding the commercial-speech exemption where “a
high-level executive of a company . . . primarily design[ed] and [sold] manufactured items to
customers . . . .”); TransDesign Int’l, LLC v. SAE Towers, Ltd., No. 09-18-00080-CV, No. 09-1800081-CV, 2019 WL 2647659, at *8–9 (Tex. App.—Beaumont June 22, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
97. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.003(a) (“If a legal action is based on or is in
response to a party’s exercise of the right of free speech, right to petition, or right of association . . . .”)
(emphasis added).
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to public participation in government, and the exercise of the right of
association, which is partially tied to expressions regarding matters “relating
to a governmental proceeding.”98
Collectively, by including the elements of public participation in
government and expression regarding matters of public concern, the
amendments to the definition of the right of association moved the focus
of the TCPA much closer to its stated purpose: the protection of constitutional
rights.
B. Narrowing the Definition of “Legal Action”
The old law:
“Legal action” means a lawsuit, cause of action, petition, complaint,
cross-claim, or counterclaim or any other judicial pleading or filing that
requests legal or equitable relief.99
The new law:
“Legal action” means a lawsuit, cause of action, petition, complaint,
cross-claim, or counterclaim or any other judicial pleading or filing that
requests legal, declaratory, or equitable relief. The term does not include:
(A) a procedural action taken or motion made in an action that does not amend or
add a claim for legal, equitable, or declaratory relief;
(B) alternative dispute resolution proceedings; or
(C) post-judgment enforcement actions.100
Under the old TCPA, courts struggled with the definition of “legal
action” because it allowed creative attorneys to plead their cases into the
TCPA’s coverage in seemingly unfathomable ways.101 As one jurist stated,

98. Compare id. § 27.001(2) (defining the right of association as involving public concern), with
id. § 27.001(4)(a)(ix) (discussing the role of public concern under the definition of the right to petition).
99. Act of June 17, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 341, § 2, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 961 (amended 2019).
100. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.001(6)(A)–(C) (emphasis added).
101. Act of June 17, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 341, § 2, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 961 (amended
2019) (“‘Legal action’ means a lawsuit, cause of action, petition, complaint, cross-claim, or counterclaim
or any other judicial pleading or filing that requests legal or equitable relief.”).
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the definition of “legal action” in the TCPA appears to encompass any
“procedural vehicle for the vindication of a legal claim.”102
Motions were filed in opposition to third party subpoenas,103 motions
for sanctions,104 and post-judgment enforcement actions.105 Lawyers even
filed TCPA motions to dismiss in response to TCPA motions to dismiss.106
In Sullivan v. Texas Ethics Commission,107 a state agency fined an individual
for failing to register as a lobbyist and the individual filed a de novo appeal
102. Paulsen v. Yarrell, 537 S.W.3d 224, 233 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet.
denied); see In re Elliott, 504 S.W.3d 455, 465 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, orig. proceeding) (holding the
TCPA’s “broad definition” encompasses a petition under the Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 202); see
Better Bus. Bureau of Metro. Dall., Inc. v. Ward, 401 S.W.3d 440, 443 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet.
denied) (stating the definition is “broad and evidences a legislative intent to treat any claim by any party
on an individual and separate basis”). But see Paulsen, 537 S.W.3d at 233 (noting, however, a TCPA
dismissal motion is not itself a TCPA “legal action”).
103. See, e.g., Wetmore v. Bresnen, No. 03-18-00467-CV, 2019 WL 6885031, at *4 (Tex. App.—
Austin Dec. 18, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding “a subpoena in this context does not meet the
definition of ‘legal action’”); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 176.1 (outlining requirements for issuing a
subpoena); CIV. P. 176.4 (providing who may issue a subpoena); Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. Highland
Capital Mgmt., L.P., 564 S.W.3d 852, 856 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2018, pet denied) (citation omitted)
(concluding subpoena is not a “legal action” because “a subpoena is not a ‘filing[,]’ [i]t is an
issuance . . . .”); Greiner v. Womack, No. 04-19-00525-CV, 2019 WL 5405904, at *1 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio Oct. 23, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding a “subpoena is not a legal action” under the
TCPA). See generally CIV. P. 176.1–6.8 (promulgating the rules for issuing a subpoena).
104. See, e.g., Hawxhurst v. Austin’s Boat Tours, 550 S.W.3d 220, 226 (Tex. App.—Austin 2018,
no pet.) (reasoning a counterclaim or motion for sanctions is a “legal action” under the TCPA); see also
Misko v. Johns, 575 S.W.3d 872, 877–78 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2019, pet. denied) (concluding the
definition of “legal action” in the TCPA does not encompass a motion for sanctions alleging discovery
abuse by a party filed after commencement of litigation).
105. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 1 (“The judicial power of this State shall be vested in one
Supreme Court, in one Court of Criminal Appeals, in Courts of Appeals, in District Courts, in County
Courts, in Commissioners Courts, in Courts of Justices of the Peace, and in such other courts as may
be provided by law.”); see also TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 21.001 (“A court has all powers necessary for
the exercise of its jurisdiction and the enforcement of its lawful orders, including authority to issue the
writs and orders necessary or proper in aid of its jurisdiction.”); Wetmore, 2019 WL 6885031, at *6
(concluding plaintiff failed to demonstrate a motion to compel and for sanctions was related to his
exercise of his TCPA rights); Sullivan v. Tex. Ethics Comm’n, 551 S.W.3d 848, 858 (Tex. App.—Austin
2018, pet. denied).
106. See, e.g., Paulsen, 537 S.W.3d at 233 (dismissing motions to dismiss as legal actions per the
TCPA); see also Roach v. Ingram, 557 S.W.3d 203, 219 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet.
denied) (holding the counter-TCPA motion to dismiss must establish the lawsuit concerned the right
of free speech in connection with a matter of public concern); Deepwell Energy Servs., LLC v. Aveda
Transp. & Energy Servs., 574 S.W.3d 925, 927–28 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2019, pet. denied) (construing
the “catch-all” phrase of the TCPA and determining a TCPA motion to dismiss was not included as a
“legal action” under the phrase “or any other judicial pleading or filing that requests legal or equitable
relief”).
107. Sullivan v. Tex. Ethics Comm’n, 551 S.W.3d 848 (Tex. App.—Austin 2018, pet. denied).
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in district court (with the agency styled as the defendant).108 The plaintiff,
Sullivan, properly sought to realign the parties, thus converting himself into
the defendant. Once the court ordered the realignment, the individual filed
a TCPA motion to dismiss the “Commission’s” action.109
In another case, an appellee filed a TCPA motion to dismiss an appeal after
filing a TCPA motion to dismiss in response to a TCPA motion to dismiss
at the trial court level. If the reader finds this description too convoluted to
follow, so did the judiciary. Justice Robert Pemberton,110 who wrote a
number of eloquently scathing opinions in TCPA cases, understatedly
noted, after summarily dismissing the appellee’s arguments, that “[a]t the
very least, we cannot conclude that the Legislature intended such a
fundamental transformation of appellate courts’ jurisdiction and procedure
without stronger textual support for that notion.”111
Ultimately, to close the virtually open-ended definition of “legal action,”
the 86th Legislature amended it to exclude certain procedural actions,
alternative dispute resolution proceedings, and post-judgment enforcement
actions. The Legislature also included “declaratory relief” to clarify that the
TCPA does apply to declaratory judgment actions.112 The Third Court of
Appeals in Austin previously held otherwise.113
Determining what is and what is not a “procedural action” may be a
challenge for courts under the new definition of legal action. By its terms,
an action or motion is not procedural if it “amend[s] or add[s] a claim for
legal, equitable, or declaratory relief.”114 As for filing TCPA motions to
dismiss in response to another party’s motion for sanctions, the new law is
clear that a “post-judgment enforcement action” for sanctions would not
constitute a “legal action” subject to the TCPA.115 One open question is
whether applying the TCPA to a pre-judgment motion for sanctions is
108. Id. at 858 (stating a TCPA motion to dismiss could not be used to dismiss the same suit as
the plaintiff filed after realignment of parties because the Legislature had provided a separate detailed
set of procedures for resolving appeals of the Commission’s administrative findings);
109. The Texas Anti-SLAPP Statute, supra note 40, at 10.
110. Now former Justice of the Third Court of Appeals.
111. Amini v. Spicewood Springs Animal Hosp., LLC, 550 S.W.3d 843, 845 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2018, no pet.).
112. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.001(6).
113. See Craig v. Tejas Promotions, LLC, 550 S.W.3d 287, 303 (Tex. App.—Austin 2018, pet.
denied) (concluding “the district court did not err in denying the TCPA motion as to the declaratory
claims . . . .”).
114. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.001(6)(A).
115. Id. § 27.001(6)(C) (emphasis added).
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procedural, and thus not a legal action. The question would be moot if the
courts find that such a motion contradicts Texas Government Code
§ 21.001(a), which provides: “A court has all powers necessary for the
exercise of its jurisdiction and the enforcement of its lawful orders, including
authority to issue the writs and orders necessary or proper in aid of its
jurisdiction.”116
The U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held the old TCPA does
not apply in federal diversity cases because its procedural framework
conflicts with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.117 In doing so, the
court asserted the state statute requires a court to determine “by a
preponderance of the evidence” whether an action relates to a party’s First
Amendment rights and whether a plaintiff must meet each element of her
claim by “clear and specific evidence.”118 The court observed that
“describing the rights afforded certain litigants under the TCPA as
‘substantive’ fails to address the uncertainty caused by the state statute’s
ongoing conflict with federal rules.”119 The Fifth Circuit ruling provides
an important basis for concluding the newly revised language remains
procedural in nature. If that view is accepted, litigants would be barred from
filing, for example, TCPA motions to dismiss to dispose of a TCPA motion
to dismiss. Whether the Legislature’s decision to strike references to the
preponderance standard undercuts some of the Fifth Circuit’s rationale for
concluding the TCPA is procedural remains to be seen.120
116. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 21.001(a) was in effect in 2011 when the TCPA was enacted.
See also TEX. CONST. art. V, § 1 (vesting judicial authorities in Texas); Sullivan v. Tex. Ethics Comm’n,
551 S.W.3d 848, 855 (Tex. App.—Austin 2018, pet. denied) (“A statute is presumed to have been
enacted by the legislature with complete knowledge of the existing law and with reference to it. A
legislative enactment covering a subject dealt with by an older law, but not repealing that law, should
be harmonized whenever possible with its predecessor in such a manner as to give effect to both.”
(quoting Acker v. Texas Water Comm’n, 790 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex. 1990))).
117. See generally Klocke v. Watson, 936 F.3d 240, 242 (5th Cir. 2019) (“Resolving an issue that
has brewed for several years in this circuit, we conclude that the TCPA does not apply to diversity
cases in federal court . . . .”).
118. See id. at 244 (analyzing the previous version of the TCPA). The 2019 revised version does
not include the term “preponderance of evidence” and now requires dismissal “if the moving party
establishes an affirmative defense or other grounds on which the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.005(d).
119. Klocke, 936 F.3d at 247.
120. However, the “clear and specific” evidence requirement in the statute remains unchanged.
See id. at 246 (citation omitted) (“‘Clear and specific evidence’ must be, inter alia, ‘unambiguous, sure,
or free from doubt.’ The standard, which lies somewhere between the state’s pleading baseline and
the standard necessary to prevail at trial, in any event exceeds the plaintiff’s Rule 56 burden to defeat
summary judgment.” (quoting In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 590 (Tex. 2015))).
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The answer to whether a Rule 202121 motion will be considered a “legal
action” under the new definition will be anticipated with great interest; the
stakeholders discussed the issue but made a conscious decision to leave that
decision up to the courts.122 Rule 202 provides for the taking of a
deposition prior to filing a suit.123 It “specifies two scenarios where [doing
so would be] proper: investigating a potential suit, or preserving witness
testimony in an anticipated suit.”124 In the case of an anticipated lawsuit,
the deposition may be granted only if the trial court finds that doing so “may
prevent a failure or delay in justice.”125 In contrast, when taken to
investigate a potential claim or suit, a deposition may be granted only if the
court finds that “the likely benefit of allowing the petitioner to take the
requested deposition to investigate a potential claim outweighs the burden
or expense of the procedure.”126
The Texas Supreme Court had an opportunity to resolve the issue of
whether a Rule 202 motion is a “legal action” under the old TCPA but
declined to do so. In Glassdoor, Inc. v. Andra Group, LP,127 the petitioner,
Andra Group, sought to depose Glassdoor, a jobs and recruiting website
where users may anonymously post reviews of their current and former
employers.128 Andra stated “that it did ‘not anticipate any claims against
Glassdoor’ but sought to ‘investigate potential claims for defamation or
business disparagement’ against the ‘anonymous persons . . . who posted’”
the reviews.129 Andra further argued “that the likely benefit” it would gain
from “the requested deposition outweighed the burden or expense.”130
Glassdoor countered that such a deposition was a “legal action” under the
TCPA, requiring Andra to make a prima facie case for its alleged defamation
121. TEX. R. CIV. P. 202.1.
122. The filed version of H.B. 2730 came closer to excluding Rule 202 as a legal action by
excluding “a motion or action related to discovery made or take under the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure, including a motion to compel, or objection to discovery” and explicitly excluded sanctions
and TCPA motions to dismiss as legal actions. Act of June 2, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 378, § 1,
sec. 27.001(6)(A), 2019 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 378 (current version at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 27.001(6)).
123. TEX. R. CIV. P. 202.1.
124. Sean D. Jordan & Peter C. Hansen, Pre-Suit Depositions Under Rule 202: A Survey of Hot Button
Issues, in 36TH ANNUAL PAGE KEETON CIVIL LITIGATION 1, 5 (2012).
125. TEX. R. CIV. P. 202.4(a)(1).
126. Id. § 202.4(a)(2).
127. Glassdoor, Inc. v. Andra Grp., LP, 575 S.W.3d 523 (Tex. 2019).
128. Id. at 525.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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claims.131 Andra responded that the TCPA does not apply to a Rule 202
proceeding because it did not fall under the (old) definition of “legal action”
and even if it did, Andra had sufficiently “established the elements of its
claims” to overcome the motion to dismiss.132 The court dodged the issue
by holding the statute of limitations barred the potential claims against
Glassdoor and therefore the underlying Rule 202 petition was moot,
dismissing the petition in its entirety.133
For TCPA lawyers and observers, the lack of clarity was frustrating
because state appellate courts had conflicting rulings on whether Rule 202
was a legal action under the old TCPA. The First Court of Appeals in
Houston ruled more than once that Rule 202 is not a legal action under the
old TCPA.134 In doing so, the court stated Rule 202 asserts no substantive
claim or cause of action upon which relief can be granted and that “a
successful Rule 202 petitioner ‘simply acquires the right to obtain
discovery—discovery that may or may not lead to a claim or cause of action
upon which relief can be granted.’”135 That court challenged contrary
rulings by other appellate courts asserting they must have read the definition
of “legal action” in insolation since the statute requires a nonmovant to
make a “prima facie case for each essential element of the claim in question”
and instructs a court considering a dismissal motion to look at “the
pleadings and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts on which
the liability or defense is based.”136 By comparison, the First Court of Appeals
read the statute by applying the doctrine of “ejusdem generis,” noting the “list
within [the] definition ‘is best characterized by observation that each
element of this [enumerated] class is a procedural vehicle for vindication of
a legal claim.’”137

131. Id.
132. Id. at 526.
133. Id. at 531.
134. See Caress v. Fortier, 576 S.W.3d 778, 781 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet.
denied) (holding “the TCPA does not apply to Rule 202 proceedings . . . .”); see also Hughes v.
Giammanco, 579 S.W.3d 672, 678–79 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, no pet.), setting aside
judgment, not vacating opinion, No. 01-18-00771-CV, 2019 WL 3331124 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2019) (following Caress as precedent for holding the same).
135. Hughes, 579 S.W.3d at 678; see also In re Emergency Consultants, 292 S.W.3d 78, 79 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (“Rule 202 does not require a
potential litigant to expressly state a viable claim before being permitted to take a pre-suit deposition.”).
136. Hughes, 579 S.W.3d at 677 (emphasis added).
137. Id. at 680.
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Other courts have held a Rule 202 petition was a legal action under the
old TCPA. The Second Court of Appeals in Fort Worth asserted that
merely looking at the plain language in the definition, a petition, is listed as a
legal action.138 The court further stated, “[R]ule 202, like all rules of civil
procedure, was fashioned by the Texas Supreme Court as a means of
‘obtain(ing) a just, fair, equitable and impartial adjudication of the rights of
litigants under established principles of substantive law.’”139 Following this
logic, some courts have stated that “while a Rule 202 petition does not seek
legal remedies in the traditional sense, it does seek an equitable remedy that
falls within the ambit of a TCPA legal action.”140
In holding or implying a Rule 202 petition is a legal action under the old
definition, some courts have allowed the deposition to go forward stating
the nonmovant is only required to establish a prima facie case for the relief
requested in the Rule 202 petition, not any claims it seeks to investigate.141
In Breakaway Practice, LLC v. Lowther,142 Breakaway Practice filed a Rule 202
petition seeking to depose the appellee, Robert Lowther, to investigate
potential claims regarding derogatory statements the appellee allegedly made
about Breakaway Practice on Facebook.143 Lowther asserted the Rule 202
petition was filed in response to the exercise of his rights of free speech and
association. In response, Breakaway Practice disputed its Rule 202 petition
was based on, related to, or was in response to Lowther’s communications.
Regardless, Breakaway argued, it met its burden to defeat the TCPA motion
to dismiss by presenting a prima facie case for its Rule 202 petition that the
likely benefit of the requested deposition outweighed the burden of expense
of the procedure.144 “To show it established a prima facie case, Breakaway
138. DeAngelis v. Protective Parents Coal., 556 S.W.3d 836, 848 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018,
no pet.).
139. Id. at 848.
140. In re Krause Landscape Contractors, Inc., 595 S.W.3d 831, 836 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
2020, no pet.) (emphasis added).
141. See Breakaway Practice, LLC v. Lowther, No. 05-18-00229-CV, 2018 WL 6695544, at *1
(Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 20, 2018, pet. denied) (deciding Breakaway met its burden in establishing a
prima facie case in its Rule 202 petition); see also Glassdoor, Inc. v. Andra Grp., LP, 575 S.W.3d 523,
526–27 (Tex. 2019) (summarizing how the Dallas Court of Appeals only required a prima facie case
for a Rule 202 petition); cf. In re Krause Landscape Contractors, Inc., 595 S.W.3d at 838–39 (stating
nonmovant’s conclusory statements in his petition and response are insufficient to establish a prima
facie case and “the benefit of the pre-suit depositions would outweigh their costs”).
142. Breakaway Practice, LLC v. Lowther, No. 05-18-00229-CV, 2018 WL 6695544 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Dec. 20, 2018, pet. denied).
143. Id. at *1.
144. Id.
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[Practice] relie[d] on its verified Rule 202 petition and Lowther’s attached
Facebook post.”145 The court concluded Breakaway Practice had met its
burden to establish a prima facie case. Thus, the trial court erred in
dismissing the petition.146
Rule 202 is a court-created creature,147 and courts will determine
whether it is deemed “procedural” under the new TCPA definition. On the
one hand, the word “petition” remains in both the TCPA definition of legal
action and the rule. On the other hand, the rule is located in the Texas Rules
of Civil Procedure and invokes the procedures governing discovery. Notably,
a Rule 202 petition may seek discovery from a person who is not the target
of anticipated litigation—meaning discovery granted under the rule may not
present a burden on the potential defendant148 who may later have the
benefit of the TCPA’s protections should a suit be filed as a result of that
discovery.
Although a successful Rule 202 petition could result in the target
incurring some unnecessary litigation costs, discovery under the rule might
also lead the petitioner to conclude whether her potential claim is timely
under the applicable statute of limitations. The rule itself contains language
requiring a balance between guarding against injustice and the cost-benefit
ratio of allowing pre-suit discovery. A Rule 202 petition cannot be used to
investigate potential claims that are not ripe149 or that would be beyond the
jurisdiction of the court petitioned.150 Moreover, “courts must strictly limit
and carefully supervise pre-suit discovery”151 under Rule 202. Given the
argument that courts have fully developed detailed procedures for regulating
the use of Rule 202 and that the rule may serve similar purposes to that of
the TCPA, courts could construe the new definition of “legal action” to
145. Id. at *3; see also Fawcett v. Grosu, 498 S.W.3d 650, 660 (Tex. App—Houston [14th Dist.]
2016, pet. denied) (recognizing a nonmovant may rely on pleadings and attachments to establish prima
facie case).
146. Breakaway Practice, LLC, 2018 WL 6695544, at *3.
147. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 31(b) (“The Supreme Court shall promulgate rules of civil
procedure for all courts not inconsistent with the laws of the state as may be necessary for the efficient
and uniform administration of justice . . . .”); see also TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.004(c) (“So that the
supreme court has full rulemaking power in civil actions, a rule adopted by the supreme court repeals
all conflicting laws and parts of laws governing practice and procedure in civil actions, but substantive
law is not repealed.”).
148. TEX. R. CIV. P. 202.1(a); see also In re Elliott, 504 S.W.3d 455, 465 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016,
orig. proceeding) (stating a court may grant a Rule 202 petition before a suit is ever filed).
149. In re DePinho, 505 S.W.3d 621, 623 (Tex. 2016).
150. Id. at 623.
151. In re Wolfe, 341 S.W.3d 932, 933 (Tex. 2011).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol52/iss1/3

26

Bresnen et al.: Targeting the Texas Citizen Participation Act

2020]

TARGETING THE TEXAS CITIZEN PARTICIPATION ACT

79

exclude Rule 202 petitions from TCPA motions to dismiss. The Legislature
did not definitively address these questions. Thus, it will be up to the courts
to decide the issue.
C. Focusing on Truly Public Concerns
The old law:
“Matter of public concern” includes an issue related to:
(A) health or safety;
(B) environmental, economic, or community well-being;
(C) the government;
(D) a public official or public figure; or
(E) a good, product, or service in the marketplace.152
The new law:
“Matter of public concern” means a statement or activity regarding:
(A) a public official, public figure, or other person who has drawn substantial public
attention due to the person’s official acts, fame, notoriety, or celebrity;
(B) a matter of political, social, or other interest to the community; or
(C) a subject of concern to the public.153
The change to the definition of “matter of public concern” is the most
significant amendment made by the 2019 TCPA legislation. While it is
beyond the scope of this Article to fully exhaust the history, development,
and application of the concept—which for decades has figured prominently
in cases involving privacy, libel, government employee speech, privileges,

152. Act of June 17, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 341, § 2, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 961 (amended
2019).
153. TEX. CIV. PRAC & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.001(7)(A)–(C) (emphasis added).
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and anti-SLAPP statutes154—this Article provides some guidance for
courts construing the statute and for advocates either prosecuting or
defending a claim.
First, to understand the appropriate use of the new TCPA, one must
understand: (1) when a matter of public concern is required to be present in
the communication or activity at issue; or (2) when the Act may be invoked
even in the absence of a matter of public concern regarding the
communication or activity. Second, understanding the origins of the
definition may prove useful for those moving to dismiss a claim under
Section 27.003, and those opposing such actions. Third, studying the
precise language of the new definition, especially in comparison to the old
law, will illuminate its intended scope. Finally, the authors hope this Section
will help parties and the courts determine when a communication or activity
may (or may not) involve a matter of public concern.
Public concern required (or not): Under the new law, absent an
exception,155 a TCPA motion to dismiss applies to a legal action “based on
or in response to” an exercise of the right of association, free speech, or
petition. By definition, to be subject to a motion to dismiss in a case
involving those rights, a claim must:
•

When based on the exercise of the right of association, meet one of
two criteria:
(1) the exercise must be related to a governmental proceeding; or
(2) the exercise must be related to a matter of public concern.156

•

When based on the exercise of the right of free speech, involves a
communication “made in connection with a matter of public
concern.”157

154. Clay Calvert, Defining “Public Concern” After Snyder v. Phelps: A Pliable Standard Mingles with
News Media Complicity, 19 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 39, 41–42 (2012).
155. See CIV. PRAC & REM. § 27.010(a) (providing exceptions to the application of Chapter 27).
In addition, by defining the term “legal action” in Section 27.001(6) to exclude certain procedural,
alternative dispute, and post-judgment matters, the legislature effectively carved out more exceptions
from the chapter’s application.
156. Id. § 27.001(7) (emphasis added). As to be discussed infra, these new, alternative prongs
actually have the effect of limiting the definition relative to the prior statute, in addition to its scope
being changed by the amended definition of “matter of public concern.”
157. Id. § 27.001(3) (emphasis added). While the language of this provision is unchanged from
the prior statute, read with the new definition of “matter or public concern,” the chapter’s purpose
provision was given new relevance.
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When based on the exercise of the right to petition, entail
communications involving any one of thirteen described activities,
one of which is “a communication in or pertaining to . . . a public
meeting dealing with a public purpose, including statements and
discussions at the meeting or other matters of public concern occurring at
the meeting.”158

On the other hand, a motion to dismiss under Section 27.003 may be
made if a legal action “arises from any act of that party in furtherance of the
party’s communication or conduct described by Section 27.010(b),”
sometimes referred to as the “media provision.”159 In a case where the
media provision applies, there is no requirement that the communication or
conduct be in connection with a matter of public concern, making the media
application potentially broader than non-media claims brought under the
TCPA.
Similarly, a matter of public concern is not required to be present for a
defendant to move to dismiss under Section 27.003 if the Section 27.010(c)
provision applies, which addresses domestic or family violence.160 Under
Section 27.010(c), the chapter “applies” if a legal action is “based on or in
response to a public or private communication” and the legal action is
“against a victim or alleged victim of family or dating violence as defined in
Chapter 71, of the Family Code, or” certain offenses against the person
defined in Chapters 20, 20A, 21, or 22 of the Penal Code.161
A matter of public concern is not expressly required under the “right to
petition” definition. However, the very nature of the described activities in
the provision will invariably involve matters of public concern. For
example, Section 27.001(4)(A)(iv) captures “a legislative proceeding,
including a proceeding of a legislative committee,”162 which by its very
nature involve discussions of matters of public concern.
Origins of the definition. Fundamentally, the TCPA and other states’
anti-SLAPP statutes163 provide methods of dismissing cases that are not
available in other types of civil litigation. That is because “[S]peech on
158. Id. § 27.001(4)(A)(ix) (emphasis added). This provision is unchanged from the prior statute
but must now be read in conjunction with the new definition of “matter of public concern.”
159. Id. § 27.003(a). See infra Part VI.A.
160. Id. § 27.010(c).
161. Id.
162. Id. § 27.001(4)(A)(iv).
163. Wasser, supra note 7.
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‘matters of public concern’ . . . is ‘at the heart of the First Amendment’s
protection.’”164 To be successful, suits against those speaking on issues of
public concern, or brought by those in the public eye against those who
speak about them, are subjected to a higher constitutional bar in civil
litigation.165 Legislatures have enacted anti-SLAPP regimes to “encourage”
the exercise of those rights and “safeguard” those who may be victimized
by intimidation through litigation.
As explained in Section III of this Article, prior to the 2019 amendments,
courts held the TCPA’s definition of “matter of public concern” was
exceedingly broad—extending even beyond protecting constitutional rights,
despite its purpose clause—such that advocates could plead into the
statute’s coverage of a wide array of activities.166 Although its purpose
provision stated—and still states—the chapter was intended to “encourage
and safeguard the constitutional rights . . . to petition, speak freely, associate
freely, and otherwise participate in government,”167 the Texas Supreme
Court and courts of appeals have repeatedly held the old law applied to cases
far beyond those simply protecting constitutional rights.168 While

164. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451–52 (2011) (citing Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758–759 (1985)).
165. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) (holding “the Constitution
delimits a State’s power to award damages for libel in actions brought by public officials against critics
of their official conduct”); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 334 (1974) (applying the
New York Times standard to a case involving statements made in a magazine).
166. Senator Bryan Hughes, sponsor of House Bill 2730 stated: “Under current law, lawyers
and judges can apply the definition to almost any type of human activity. . . . And this definition is
partly why this statute has been litigated more than any other statute on our books.” S.J. of Tex., 86th
Leg., R.S. 2011, 2024 (2019).
167. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.002 (emphasis added). House Bill 2730 did not amend this
provision.
168. See Youngkin v. Hines, 546 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. 2018) (“Substituting the statutory
definitions for the defined terms, we see that the TCPA applies to a legal action against a party that is
based on, related to, or in response to the party’s making or submitting of a statement or document in
or pertaining to a judicial proceeding.”); see also Adams v. Starside Custom Builders, LLC, 547 S.W.3d
890, 892 (Tex. 2018) (“The statutory definition is not fully coextensive with the constitutional freespeech right protected by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I, section 8 of the
Texas Constitution.”); Abatecola v. 2 Savages Concrete Plumbing, LLC, No. 14-17-00678-CV,
2018 WL 3118601, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 26, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.)
(stating the TCPA is “very broadly applied” and explaining its application); Price v. Buschemeyer,
No. 12-17-00180-CV, 2018 WL 1569856, at *2 (Tex. App.—Tyler Mar. 29, 2018, pet. denied) (“The
TCPA does not discriminate between public and private communications as long as they are made in
connection with a matter of public concern.” (citing Lippincott v. Whisenhunt, 462 S.W.3d 507, 509
(Tex. 2015) (per curiam))); Collins v. Collins, No. 01-17-00817-CV, 2018 WL 1320841, at *3 (Tex.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol52/iss1/3

30

Bresnen et al.: Targeting the Texas Citizen Participation Act

2020]

TARGETING THE TEXAS CITIZEN PARTICIPATION ACT

83

effectively reducing the chapter’s sweep, the Legislature re-focused the
TCPA by more closely aligning the definition of a “matter of public
concern” with the constitutional rights enumerated in the purpose
provision.169
House Bill 2730, as introduced, would have eliminated the definition of
“matter of public concern” entirely and limited the TCPA to legal actions
based on or in response to the exercise of a party’s speech, association or
petition rights “as those rights are provided by the constitutions of this state
and the United States, as applied by the courts of this state and the United
States.”170 While the Legislature removed that language, the final bill made
the TCPA much closer to the filed bill’s constitution-only approach as
compared to the old law.
Many states’ anti-SLAPP laws have taken the approach of expressly tying
anti-SLAPP laws to the federal and state constitutions.171 Those states’
laws have clearly directed courts to tether their statutory constructions to
limit the coverage of their anti-SLAPP statutes to state and federal
constitutionally protected speech.172 That approach allows courts to deny
the protection of their anti-SLAPP statutes to speech that is not
constitutionally protected, even in fact situations where protected and

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 15, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (recognizing the expansive view of
the TCPA extending past constitutional rights).
169. House Comm. on the Judiciary and Civ. Jurisprudence, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 2730, 86th
Leg., R.S. (2019) [hereinafter Tex. H.B. 2730 Bill Analysis] (“[C]ertain statutory provisions relating to
expedited dismissal procedures for lawsuits involving the exercise of free speech, the right of
association, and the right to petition may lend themselves to unexpected applications because they are
overly broad or unclear. C.S.H.B. 2730 seeks to remedy this issue by clarifying the scope and
applicability of those provisions.”).
170. Tex. H.B. 2730, 86th Leg., R.S. (2019).
To see the bill as filed, visit
https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/86R/billtext/pdf/HB02730I.pdf#navpanes=0 [https://perma.cc/
4ASW-CB9X].
171. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-751 (2006); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-63-501
(West 2005); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE. § 425.16 (West 2015); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-196a
(West 2019); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.295 (West 2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1 (West 2016);
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/1 (West 2007); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-7-7-3 (West 2020); LA. CODE
CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 971 (2012); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556 (2012); MD. CODE ANN., CTS.
& JUD. PROC. § 5-807 (West 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 59H (West 1994); 9 R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 9-33-2 (West 2020); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-1003 (West 1997); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 1041 (West 2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-223.2 (West 2017).
172. See, e.g., Flatley v. Mauro, 139 P.3d 2, 9 (Cal. 2006) (“The [California] Anti-SLAPP statute
does not apply to speech and petitioning activity that is illegal as a matter of law and, therefore, not
constitutionally protected”) (capitalization altered).
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unprotected speech are mixed.173 Under the new TCPA, the definition of
“matter of public concern” is not expressly tied to constitutionally protected
speech, although the definition is stated in terms applying constitutional
principles. Because the language of the new definition may cover fact
situations beyond constitutionally protected speech, ultimately only time will
tell the extent to which the statute will be applied in the future.
The new definition of matter of public concern was inserted into the 2019
bill as it passed out of the House Committee174 and remained unchanged
through the subsequent legislative process and into law. In a colloquy with
Senator Kirk Watson (D-Austin), bill sponsor Senator Bryan Hughes (RMineola) stated the Legislature’s intent before the full Senate as it
unanimously passed House Bill 2730:175 courts applying the new definition
should look to the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Snyder v. Phelps176 and
FilmOn.com v. DoubleVerify (Filmon),177 a case construing the California antiSLAPP statute, for guidance.178
Senator Hughes stated: “The public figure issue is taken from a recent
California Supreme Court case called Filmon v. DoubleVerify.”179 He also
observed: “California’s anti-SLAPP statute is older than ours and is
considered the model, after it was also reformed some years ago.180 This is
very important because the [new Texas] statute will have established

173. See Baral v. Schnitt, 376 P.3d 604, 614 (Cal. 2016) (holding “when the defendant seeks to
strike particular claims supported by allegations of protected activity that appear alongside other claims
within a single cause of action, the motion cannot be defeated by showing a likelihood of success on
the claims arising from unprotected activity”).
174. See Tex. H.B. 2730 Bill Analysis, supra note 168.
175. Parties who were opposed to the original bill have agreed with the intention Snyder should
supply the principles informing the definition of “matter of public concern.” PROTECT FREE SPEECH
COAL., CONCERNS ABOUT CSHB 2730 (an undated document available from the House author’s
office provided to the House Committee on the Judiciary and Civil Jurisprudence during consideration
of the legislation).
176. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
177. FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc., 439 P.3d 1156 (Cal. 2019).
178. Id. at 1164.
179. S.J. of Tex., 86th Leg., R.S. 2011, 2024 (2019).
180. Id.; see also 2003 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 338 (S.B. 515) (current version at CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 425.17(a)) (“The Legislature finds and declares that there has been a disturbing abuse of
Section 425.16, the California Anti-SLAPP Law, which has undermined the exercise of the
constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances, contrary to the
purpose and intent of Section 425.16. The Legislature finds and declares that it is in the public interest
to encourage continued participation in matters of public significance, and that this participation should
not be chilled through abuse of the judicial process or Section 425.16.”).
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jurisprudence to guide Texas courts on how to apply the new law.”181
In Filmon, both the lower appellate court and the California Supreme
Court relied on the well-established principle cited in the California antiSLAPP statute regarding the “public issue” prong. In California, “public
issue” cases include cases where the statement or activity precipitating the
underlying cause of action “was [about] ‘a person or entity in the public
eye.’”182
Section 27.001(7)(A) of the new Texas law addresses communications
regarding those in the public eye—a recognition of the constitutional
barriers to litigation imposed on certain individuals, including public
officials and public figures. This new language is somewhat broader than
the comparable provision in the prior law. The terms “public official”183
and “public figure”184 have established legal meanings that may not
encompass all of those now included under the new law’s additional
reference to “other person who has drawn substantial public attention due
to the person’s official acts, fame, notoriety, or celebrity.”185
In Section 27.001(7)(A), the Legislature specifically requires there be
“substantial public attention” drawn to a person on the basis of their actions.
This choice of language demonstrates the Legislature’s intent to narrow the
definition’s reach by steering away from applying this element to essentially
private concerns. There was no such express limitation in the prior
provision.186 The new TCPA’s focus on the attention drawn by a person’s
public acts, rather than her mere status as a public official or public figure,
is reminiscent of the Texas Supreme Court’s approach in Foster v. Laredo
Newspapers, Inc.187 Foster construed a provision of the Texas libel statute188
applicable to public officials. Given the facts of the case, the Court
distinguished between an elected official’s public duties and the private
consulting activities at issue to determine he was not a public official for

181. S.J. of Tex., 86th Leg., R.S. 2011, 2024 (2019).
182. FilmOn.com Inc., 439 P.3d at 1162.
183. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
184. See generally Hutchison v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n,
Inc., 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
185. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.001(7)(A).
186. See Act of June 2, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 378, § 1, sec. 27.001(7)(A), 2019 Tex. Sess. Law
Serv. 378 (current version at CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.001(7)(A)) (adding the requirement of
“substantial public attention”).
187. Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. 1976).
188. Id.
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purposes of the statute, which also has a public concern element.189
The new statutory language in Sections 27.001(7)(B) and (C) is nearly
identical to language in the Snyder Court’s holding:
Speech deals with matters of public concern when it can “be fairly considered
as relating to any matter of political, social or other concern to the community” or
when it “is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general
interest and of value and concern to the public.”190

Section 27.001(7)(B) is a virtual recitation of the Snyder Court’s phrase
“political, social or other concern to the community,”191 which is based on
Connick v. Myers,192 a case involving government employee speech.193
Section 27.001(7)(C), is a truncated version of language the Snyder Court
derived from City of San Diego v. Roe,194 which also involved a government
employer-employee dispute, but relied heavily on precedents involving
media defendants.195 Section 27.001(7)(C) omits Snyder’s references to
“legitimate news interest,” “general interest” and “value . . . to the
public.”196 Representatives from the media had concerns the modifier
“legitimate” before “news interests,” for example, would create an obvious
avenue to dispute or attack whether the content of their news was, in fact,
“legitimate.”197 This same concern has been expressed in academic
writings following Snyder.198
Translating the prose of judicial opinions into statutory language is
seldom a precise operation.
Legislatures simply have different
considerations in drafting statutes than courts do in writing opinions. For
189. Id. at 817. See also CIV. PRAC. & REM. §§ 73.002(a), 73.002(b)(1)(D), 73.002(b)(2), 73.005
(clarifying which activities are privileged and outlining the ruling procedures).
190. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453 (2011) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
191. Id.
192. Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
193. Id. at 140.
194. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77 (2004) (per curiam).
195. Id.
196. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.001(7)(C).
197. See M.G. v. Time Warner, Inc., 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504, 513 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (“Intensely
personal or intimate revelations might not, in a given case, be considered newsworthy, especially where
they bear only slight relevance to a topic of legitimate public concern.”); cf. Gaeta v. Home Box Office,
645 N.Y.S.2d 707, 710 (N.Y. 1996) (concluding the HBO program featuring plaintiff concerned a
matter of public interest).
198. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453 (2011) (defining a matter of public concern as one
concerning a “legitimate news interest”); see also Calvert, supra note 153, at 56–57 (discussing problems
arising from the term “legitimate”).
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example, statutes contain no dicta, and cannot rely on pages of caveats and
nuance for their complete meaning. Also, in many cases, the language of
judicial opinions, does not incorporate the conventions contained in
legislative drafting manuals.199
Furthermore, the reference to “legitimate news interest” was rendered
unnecessary by the inclusion of Section 27.010(b), which effectively applies
the TCPA to any journalistic work. Perhaps more importantly, the omission
also protects judges, journalists, publishers, and the public from courts
making decisions regarding what interest in news is “legitimate” or what
might be deemed “fake.” “In the American legal system, newsworthiness
is . . . ‘a wide-reaching concept.’”200 “There is, in fact, ‘no universally
accepted test to determine whether a particular fact or incident is
newsworthy and therefore constitutionally protected . . . .’”201 In addition,
the Snyder formulation’s inclusion of “general interest” is unnecessary
because the statutory language already requires “interest to the community” or
“concern to the public.”202 Adding a general interest phrase to the new
statutory language would have simply been redundant.203
Finally, adding the words “value and” before the phrase “concern to the
public” in Section 27.001(7)(C) might have incentivized advocates to argue
that two elements must be present—both value and concern—for that
subsection to apply. If one is concerned about something, one has attached
value to that something—whether positive or negative. People are not
concerned with things that have no value to them. The Legislature simply
avoided future arguments about whether something must be both valued and
of concern to be covered by the definition and, again, avoided redundant
language.

199. See, e.g., Texas Legislative Council Drafting Manual, TEX. LEGIS. COUNCIL 1
(2018), https://tlc.texas.gov/docs/legref/draftingmanual-86.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2BY-FNG7]
(providing guidelines for drafting style and usage).
200. Calvert, supra note 153, at 47 (citing Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Prosser’s
Privacy and the German Right of Personality: Are Four Privacy Torts Better than One Unitary Concept, 98 CALIF.
L. REV. 1925, 1971 (2010)).
201. Id.
202. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.001(7)(B)–(C) (emphasis added) (requiring
“interest to the community” or “a subject of concern to the public” to deem a matter one of public
concern).
203. See Calvert, supra note 153, at 46–47 (“[A] newsworthiness standard ‘involves essentially
the same inquiry as a ‘public concern’ test.” (quoting Mary-Rose Papandrea, Citizen Journalism and the
Reporter’s Privilege, 91 MINN. L. REV. 515, 580 (2007))).
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At first glance, the new Texas definition may appear circular—something
is a matter of public concern if it is of concern to the public. However, the
importance of the new statute’s repeated invocation of concern “to the public”
can be better understood in the context of Snyder, including prior cases204
and subsequent critical review.205 “‘[N]ot all speech is of equal First
Amendment importance,’ however, and where matters of purely private
significance are at issue, First Amendment protections are often less
rigorous.”206 Rather, “speech on public issues occupies the highest rung of
the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and is entitled to special
protection.”207 It is this special protection that anti-SLAPP laws
appropriately provide.
Given its stated effort to clarify and narrow the statute, the irony of the
Legislature’s reliance on Snyder as the source of the new definition is
underscored by the fact that, under Snyder’s formulation, “the boundaries of
the public concern test are not well-defined.”208 It should be no surprise
that statutory drafting in this area would be problematic; the definitional
problem was engrained well before Snyder, which was decided in 2011.209
As recognized in a 1988 law review article on the subject: “[I]t is impossible
to address all the circumstances in which the question of speech on a matter
of public concern may arise. . . . [E]ven under existing precedent there is
substantial contradiction, and there is no reason to anticipate this conflict
will subside over time.”210 The article includes lists of cases, as of its
publication, holding various matters to be of public concern and others to

204. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976) (suggesting a seventeen-month
long, high-profile divorce, complete with salacious allegations regarding very wealthy and prominent
people, was not a matter of public concern).
205. For an excellent (and critical) review of the development of the public concern concept,
its relationship to public figure analysis, and the requirement in certain cases to prove actual malice,
see Mark Strasser, What’s It to You: The First Amendment and Matters of Public Concern, 77 MO. L. REV.
1083 (2012).
206. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988)); see Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145–47 (1983)
(discussing the classification of “matters of public concern”).
207. Snyder, 562 U.S. at 452 (quoting City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83 (2004)).
208. Id..
209. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 79 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The
plurality’s doctrine also threatens society’s interest in protecting private individuals from being thrust
into the public eye by the distorting light of defamation. This danger exists since all human events are
arguably within the area of ‘public or general concern.’”)
210. Stephen Allred, From Connick to Confusion: The Struggle to Define Speech on Matters of Public
Concern, 64 IND. L.J. 43, at 75–76 (1988).
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be merely private.211 However, courts and practitioners may find these lists
useful, if not entirely satisfying—although readers must review each
example in light of subsequent cases discussing the concept.
Regardless of the difficulties presented for litigants and courts, the notion
that there are matters of public concern “suggests the flipside that some
information must be of private concern.”212 To illustrate the distinction,
Snyder cited two important examples of cases in which the Court held that
the communications at issue involved purely private concerns. From these
examples, advocates and courts may extract some principles to draw lines
between public and private concerns.
First, in Snyder, the Court held the defendants’ speech related to matters
of public concern and contrasted Snyder’s facts—the Westboro Baptist
Church protests on public property at a fallen soldier’s funeral regarding,
inter alia, homosexuality in the military and scandals within the Catholic
Church213—with those in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,214
in which the Court held the distribution of an individual company’s credit
reports to only a handful of private subscribers was not a matter of public
concern.215 Second, the Court cited City of San Diego v. Roe, in which the
Court found a government-employer’s actions against one of its employees
who appeared in a sexually explicit video did not amount to regulating
communication about a public concern.216
In addition, the Snyder Court set out broad techniques the courts should
follow in determining whether a given communication relates to a matter of
public concern:
Deciding whether speech is a matter of public concern requires us to examine
the “content, form, and context” of that speech, “as revealed by the whole
record.” . . . In considering content, form, and context, no factor is
dispositive, and it is necessary to evaluate all the circumstances of the speech,
including what was said, where it was said, and how it was said.217

211. Id. at 59 n.100, 74 n.209.
212. See Calvert, supra note 153, at 47.
213. Snyder, 562 U.S. at 448.
214. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
215. Id. at 761–62.
216. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84 (2004) (per curiam).
217. Snyder, 562 U.S. at 453–54 (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 761). Interestingly,
the California Supreme Court in Filmon engaged in analysis nearly identical to its language in Snyder
regarding the “public issue” terminology in the state’s anti-SLAPP statute, except Filmon referred to
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In Brady v. Klentzman,218 the Texas Supreme Court demonstrated it
understands the First Amendment analysis compelled by Snyder regarding
matters of public concern and how to apply that analytical framework to the
facts of a case before it.219 Klentzman involved the performance of a local
police chief in relation to his department’s involvement with his son’s
alleged criminal conduct.220 The opinion cites Snyder and quotes it
extensively, including the language borrowed by the Texas Legislature for
House Bill 2730.221
In a 2019 TCPA case construing the former definition of “matter of
public concern,” the court in Creative Oil & Gas LLC v. Lona Hilla Ranch
LLC 222 quoted Klentzman (omitting the citation to Snyder but quoting its
key language): “The phrase ‘matter of public concern’ commonly refers to
matters ‘of political, social, or other concern to the community,’ as opposed
to purely private matters.”223 The Legislature’s inclusion of Snyder’s
language in the 2019 anti-SLAPP reform legislation should be a clear signal
to Texas courts that, like Klentzman and Creative Oil & Gas, they are to apply
established methods of determining what is and what is not a matter of
public concern.224
The definition’s plain language. Texas courts have long held that plain
statutory language is the binding factor in determining legislative intent;
unless the statutory language is ambiguous, courts are not to resort to
extrinsic indices of legislative intent,225 such as statements in the journal
of a legislative body.226 Were a court to find the new definition ambiguous,
it could consider extrinsic sources of legislative intent, such as

the precedents construing California’s law rather than citing the U.S. Supreme Court precedents Snyder
relied upon and other federal constitutional cases. See FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc., 439 P.3d
1156, 1160 (Cal. 2019) (citing California statutes and cases in its discussion surrounding “public issue”).
218. Brady v. Klentzman, 515 S.W.3d 878 (Tex. 2017).
219. Id. at 884.
220. Id. at 881–82.
221. Id. at 884.
222. Creative Oil & Gas, LLC v. Lona Hills Ranch, LLC, 591 S.W.3d 127 (Tex. 2019).
223. Id. at 135 (citing Brady, 515 S.W.3d at 884).
224. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453 (2011) (providing the preexisting framework for
the Texas Legislature’s definition of “public concern”); Creative Oil & Gas, LLC, 591 S.W.3d at 135
(relying on Snyder to analyze “matters of public concern”); Brady, 515 S.W.3d at 884.
225. Molinet v. Kimbrell, 356 S.W.3d 407, 411 (Tex. 2011); Fleming Foods of Texas, Inc. v.
Rylander, 6 S.W.3d 278, 282–83 (Tex. 1999).
226. See Tex. Health Presbyterian Hosp. of Denton v. D.A., 569 S.W.3d 126, 136 (Tex. 2018)
(“[S]tatements explaining an individual legislator’s intent cannot reliably describe the legislature’s intent.”).
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Senator Hughes’s statement, and other factors.227
Although informative, Senator Hughes’ explanation to his Senate
colleagues was also precisely consistent with the statute’s plain language.
While the new definition of matter of public concern appears less concrete
than the eleven separate categories under the old law, the plain language of
the new definition is unambiguous when: (1) compared to the extraordinary
range of the old law; (2) followed by the guidance of Snyder; (3) considered
in harmony with the chapter’s purpose provision, and; (4) defined in terms
of the constitutional rights expressly sought to be “encourage[ed] and
safeguard[ed]”228 by the chapter.
It will be helpful to contrast the language of the new definition with the
old law to derive the Legislature’s intention to emphasize the public within
“public concern” and reduce the definition’s scope.
The old law provided that if an issue was “related to” one of eleven
specified subjects, the issue was a matter of public concern.229 Because the
old law provided that a matter of public concern “included” one of the
eleven specified subjects, based on the definition of the word “includes,”230
the list was not exclusive. The Legislature narrowed the definition by
striking the words “related to” from the old definition because courts have
held that phrase to be the most inclusive in comparison to phrases such as
“arising out of” and “based on.”231 Further narrowing was achieved by
also striking the word “includes,” substituting the requirement that a
statement or activity must be “regarding” one of the three subject matter

227. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.023 (listing permissible factors to be considered when
construing statutes).
228. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.002.
229. Taylor, supra note 41, at 2.
230. See GOV’T § 311.005(13) (“‘Includes’ and ‘including’ are terms of enlargement and not of
limitation or exclusive enumeration, and use of the terms does not create a presumption that
components not expressed are excluded.”); see also Cunningham v. Waymire, No. 14-17-00883-CV,
2019 WL 5382597, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 22, 2019, no pet.) (“‘The TCPA does
not require that the statements specifically “mention”’ any of the listed matters of public concern, ‘nor
does it require more than a “tangential relationship”’ to same; rather, the TCPA applies so long as the
defendant’s statements are ‘in connection with’ ‘issue[s] related to’ any of the matters of public concern
listed in the statute.” (quoting ExxonMobil Pipeline Co. v. Coleman, 512 S.W.3d 895, 900 (Tex. 2017)
(per curiam) (quoting TCPA § 27.001(3), (7)))).
231. Robert B. James, DDS, Inc. v. Elkins, 553 S.W.3d 596, 604 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2018, pet. denied) (“Conversely, the Legislature declined to use a broader qualifying phrase like ‘relates
to.’ In the insurance contract exemption, the Legislature purposely used the phrase ‘arising out of’ and
not ‘based on,’ ‘brought under,’ or ‘relates to.’” (quoting Cadena Comercial USA Corp. v. Tex.
Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 518 S.W.3d 318, 325–26 (Tex. 2017)).
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areas listed in the new definition.232 These changes to the TCPA, among
others, should be sufficient to override the Texas Supreme Court’s
“directive that a communication’s ‘tangential relationship’ to a matter of
public concern is sufficient to establish exercise of the right of free
speech”233 or other rights dependent on the definition of public concern
for coverage under the chapter. In the future, the new definition will require
a far more direct connection between the communication at issue and the
claim in the suit, especially considering other parts of the TCPA in which
the Legislature struck “related to” in favor of a more specific nexus between
the claims in the suit and any communication alleged to provide the basis
for the claims.234
The language of the eleven subject matters in the prior definition can be
categorized as those having no express public interest element, those with
implied public interest elements, and those having express public interest
elements.
Two of the subjects—“health or safety”—contained no express or
implied language that the issue must be of interest to the public or concern
to the community. For example, the plain language of the statute (“health”)
allowed a dispute regarding payment of a hospital’s lien interest in one
individual’s recovery in a personal injury lawsuit to be within the definition of
“public concern.”235 The health and safety realm also included a bizarre
private family feud which hardly affected the public.236 These types of
examples illustrate the extraordinary breadth of the construction given to
the prior law in the absence of language emphasizing the public interest
element of the communication.
232. Compare Act of June 17, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 341, § 2, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 961
(amended 2019) (proposing “‘Matter of public concern’ includes an issue related to” five potential
circumstances), with CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.001(7) (codifying a “‘matter of public concern’ means a
statement or activity regarding” three listed circumstances).
233. Cook v. Simmons, No. 05-19-00091-CV, 2019 WL 5884426, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas
Nov. 12, 2019, pet. filed) (mem. op.).
234. See infra Part VII.
235. See E. Tex. Med. Ctr. v. Hernandez, No. 12-17-00333, 2018 WL 2440508, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Tyler May 31, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“The filing of the hospital lien is necessarily a
communication that relates to health. The provision of medical services by a health care professional
constitutes a matter of public concern.”).
236. Cavin v. Abbott, 545 S.W.3d 47, 49–50 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, no pet.) (“Among our
holdings, we are compelled to conclude that the TCPA’s protections extend to—and, ultimately,
require dismissal of claims complaining of—statements by the bride’s parents that their daughter’s
suitor won her hand through use of ‘Marxist’ brainwashing, hypnotic implantation of phobias and false
memories, or similar mind-control tactics.”).
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Several of the eleven subjects listed in the old law contained at least an
implied requirement that a communication regarding them be of interest to
the larger community, including “environmental or economic well-being;”
“the government;” and a “public official or public figure.”237 For example,
the words “environmental or economic” could connote something larger
than narrow private interest. “Government” usually refers to something of
interest to the greater public. Public officials and public figures may, by use
of the word “public,” arguably be tied to something broader 238 than narrow
private interest.
On the other hand, under the prior language, the TCPA might have been
applied to the communications of an individual concerned only with her
own economic well-being or an environmental hazard affecting only the
well-being of her isolated rural dwelling. Or, the old TCPA may have
applied to a communication targeting a person who was technically a public
official but only addressed his actions as a private person, as in Foster.239
These types of hypotheticals under the old definition of “matter of public
concern” show the opportunities for creative advocacy the prior definition
presented and why the Legislature changed its approach. The new
definition will not deprive advocates of opportunities to attempt to plead
their clients’ disputes into the TCPA’s coverage, but the Legislature’s clear
intent is to focus the statute on public—not private—interests.
Two provisions in the prior definition contained language making the
public interest element an express requirement. The old law’s category for
“community well-being” indicated it applied beyond private interests,
although the Texas Supreme Court applied the provision even to a small
residential subdivision’s concerns with “malfeasance and criminality by the
developer and the [Homeowners Association].”240
Similarly, the old definition covered communications about a “good,
product, or service in the marketplace.”241 In a late 2019 TCPA opinion, the
court held the phrase “in the marketplace,” under the old definition,

237. Compare Act of June 17, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 341, § 2, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 961
(amended 2019) (emphasis added) (listing factors implicitly requiring communal interest), with CIV.
PRAC. & REM. § 27.001(7) (containing explicit language requiring communal interest).
238. Cavin, 545 S.W.3d at 61 n.48 (noting the dictionary definition of the term “public” refers
to the community when it is used as an adjective).
239. Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809, 817 (Tex. 1976).
240. Adams v. Starside Custom Builders, LLC, 547 S.W.3d 890, 896 (Tex. 2018).
241. Act of June 17, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 341, § 2, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 961 (amended
2019) (emphasis added).
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indicated something broader than limited private interests must be present
to invoke that component of the former definition.242 Based on the facts
in Creative Oil & Gas,243 the court held, while the dispute arguably involved
a product, the dispute was limited to communications to a third party
regarding a single oil and gas lease with limited production, much like the
approach taken by the U.S. Supreme Court in Dun & Bradstreet as discussed
in Snyder. As the Texas Supreme Court noted, “The ‘in the marketplace’
modifier suggests that the communication about goods or services must
have some relevance to a wider audience of potential buyers or sellers in the
marketplace, as opposed to communications of relevance only to the parties
to a particular transaction.”244
While some may argue the new definition of “matter of public concern”
is vague or ambiguous, the new language may focus more clearly on
communications involving public interest and should be easier to apply than
the prior law. Unlike the old law, the new definition of “matter of public
concern” precludes its application to narrow private interests, relying
internally as it does on such words as “public,” “community,” and
“substantial public attention.”245 At the risk of being criticized for
appearing circular, redundant, and ambiguous, the Legislature carefully
chose unmistakable language from mainstream jurisprudence to emphasize
that, going forward, it is the “public” interest in a communication that will
drive the applicability of the TCPA.
242. Creative Oil & Gas, LLC v. Lona Hills Ranch, LLC, 591 S.W.3d 127, 135 (Tex. 2019).
243. Id. at 136; cf. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011) (“[R]estricting speech on purely
private matters does not implicate the same constitutional concerns as limiting speech on matters of
public interest[.]” (citing Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760
(1985))).
244. Creative Oil & Gas, 591 S.W.3d at 134; see Erdner v. Highland Park Emergency Ctr., LLC,
580 S.W.3d 269, 277 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2019, pet. denied) (“Construing the statute to denote that all
private business discussions are a ‘matter of public concern’ if the business offers a good, service, or
product in the marketplace or is related to health or safety is a potentially absurd result that was not
contemplated by the Legislature.”). This opinion was published May 22, 2019, which was one day after
House Bill 2730—containing the new definition of public concern—was sent to the governor.
However, the case was still subject to the old law. See Garrison Inv. Grp. LP v. Lloyd Jones Capital,
LLC, No. 02-19-00115-CV, 2019 WL 5996979, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 14, 2019, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (holding the TCPA was inapplicable to a business dispute involving an apartment complex
with a federally-insured mortgage because the parties’ negotiations and transactions did not qualify as
a matter of public concern but related only to a private dispute having nothing to do with the character
or status of the facility or its mortgage insurance).
245. Compare TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.001(7)(A)–(C) (codifying current
reliance on “substantial public attention”) with Act of June 17, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 341, § 2,
2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 961 (amended 2019) (omitting the phrase “substantial public attention”).
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Still, courts will determine the full sweep of the new law. For example,
under the old law, a small subdivision was treated as a “community” with
little or no discussion of what the word “community” encompassed, while
a small number of participants in a potential transaction regarding a product
was insufficient to invoke the “in the marketplace” component of the
definition.246 Standing alone, the Legislature’s use of the phrase “interest
to the community” in the new Section 27.001(7)(B) tells us no more than
the old law about the nature of a community that will be needed to invoke
that part of the new definition going forward. It is conceivable the courts
will apply the new language inclusively, as the Texas Supreme Court did by
using the “community well-being” phrase of the old law, meaning a
community need not be very large to bring it within that aspect of the
statute’s public concern ambit. Or, courts may follow a more limiting
approach, as the court did in Creative Oil & Gas, to find a limited number of
private participants involved in a narrowly broadcast communication does
not raise the kind of public interest concerns given heightened constitutional
protection.247
Lawyers appreciated the fact that eight years of precedent under the prior
law had provided guidance regarding how the courts should apply the phrase
“matter of public concern.” But, as demonstrated by this Article and

246. See Adams v. Starside Custom Builders, LLC, 547 S.W.3d 890, 896 (Tex. 2018) (holding
the concerns of a small residential community “likely concern[ed] the well-being of the community as
a whole”); see also Creative Oil & Gas, LLC, 591 S.W.3d at 135 (“The words ‘good, product, or service
in the marketplace,’ however, do not paradoxically enlarge the concept of ‘matters of public concern’
to include matters of purely private concern.” (quoting CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.001(7)(E))).
247. Senator Hughes shared the following colloquy with Senator Jose Menéndez on the Senate
Floor:
Senator Menéndez: How would this bill impact neighborhood groups that oppose projects in
their area? Would it impact them in any way? Would this bill keep neighborhoods protected and
make sure they have a voice of a public concern, such a city project?
Senator Hughes: Senator Menéndez, the bill we hope to pass would protect their right to voice
their objection on matters of public concern. No problem.
Senator Menéndez: No problem, and so I’m glad because I’ve had the experience where they have
been threatened they’re going to get sued and that they would not be able to come out from under
the costs of those lawsuits, so really there was a chilling effect on their voice.
Senator Hughes: That would be a bad result, and the language of this bill solves that problem.
Senator Menéndez: Thank you very much. I appreciate that.
S.J. of Tex., 86th Leg., R.S. 2011, 2025 (2019).
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numerous other sources,248 there is even more robust, not to mention
constitutionally sound, precedent guiding the application of the new public
concern definition because it is actually grounded in constitutional law.249
It should also be noted some issues presented by the old definition, which
lacked a causal link to matters of public concern under the old law, are
addressed as exemptions to the application of the TCPA in the new law.250
Thus, at least some of the difficulties of applying the new public concern
definition are negated by the new law’s other definitional changes and
exemptions. Those exceptions are discussed in Parts V and VI of this
Article.
In summary, the Legislature reached three goals in refining the definition
of “matter of public concern”: (1) it chose specific language that adopted
constitutional speech categories regarding those in the public eye and
Snyder’s formula for determining the meaning of public concern;251 (2) it
brought the revised chapter into harmony with its stated and unchanged
purpose;252 and (3) it provided accompanying analytical tools for
implementing those categories,253 with which Texas courts are
demonstrably familiar.254 In applying the language of the new definition,
Texas courts can interpret the chapter by following established law and
repeatedly using terms that auger against applications to narrow private
interests. Applying the concept of public concern in the TCPA context may
remain somewhat difficult for courts and litigants, but that result merely
demonstrates preserving broad anti-SLAPP protections for the exercise of
constitutional rights is a legislative priority.
Other sources for “public concern”: One virtue of the Legislature’s
new definition of “matter of public concern” is the concept, no matter how
248. See R. George Wright, Speech on Matters of Public Interest and Concern, 37 DEPAUL L. REV. 27,
27 (1987) (providing guidance on the distinction between public and private concerns). See generally
John E. Rumel, Public Employee Speech: Answering the Unanswered and Related Questions in Lane v. Franks,
34 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 243 (2017) (discussing the importance of Lane v. Franks as precedent
for analyzing matters of public concern).
249. See Wright, supra note 248, at 27 (shedding light on the concern with judicial definitions of
“public concern”).
250. Act of June 17, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 341, § 2, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 961 (amended
2019).
251. Calvert, supra note 153, at 44.
252. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.021(2) (“In enacting a statute, it is presumed that: . . .
(2) the entire statute is intended to be effective[.]”).
253. Id. § 311.021(4) (“In enacting a statute, it is presumed that: . . . (4) a result feasible of
execution is intended[.]”).
254. Brady v. Klentzman, 515 S.W.3d 878, 884 (Tex. 2017).
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amorphous, is not new. Indeed, there are so many potential sources
available for fleshing out the new language that a substantial listing—let
alone a comprehensive one—is well beyond the scope of this Article. The
authors suggest several lines of inquiry that may prove useful in identifying
cases that have held matters of public concern were at issue and others in
which matters of public concern were not involved. The policy and
procedural analyses that went into those decisions may help parties and
courts apply the concept to a given set of facts.
First, the leading First Amendment cases of the modern era, even prior
to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,255 have addressed the public concern
concept in many factual contexts, resulting in frequent discussion by
commentators regarding the application and effects of the concept.
Justice Frank Murphy was perhaps the first Supreme Court Justice to
articulate the concept that the First Amendment afforded greater protection
to matters of public interest. In Thornhill v. Alabama,256 Justice Murphy wrote
that “The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution
embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters
of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent
punishment . . . [.]”257

Thornhill was a challenge to Alabama’s criminal statute prohibiting the
picketing of a business, in which the Court said: “[L]abor relations are not
matters of mere local or private concern. Free discussion concerning
industry conditions and the causes of labor disputes appears to us
indispensable to the effective and intelligent use of the processes of popular
government to shape the destiny of modern industrial society.”258 Of
course, Thornhill was not the oldest First Amendment case, but it clearly
articulated the functional importance of free speech, connecting it to the
needs of self-government and distinguishing local or private concerns from
public concerns.
Since Thornhill, the public concern concept has been at the forefront of
U.S. Constitutional jurisprudence “primarily in two categories of free-speech

255. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
256. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
257. Matters of Public Concern, NATIONWIDE CONSUMER RTS., https://www.nationwide
consumerrights.com/matters-of-public-concern.html [https://perma.cc/2FLX-CZBY].
258. Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 103.
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cases: those involving speech by government employees and those involving
defamation”259 and other cases sounding in tort.260
Those researching public concern cases will note the concept has played
a central role in First Amendment jurisprudence. The Texas Supreme
Court’s opinion in Klentzman, discussed above, contains an explanation of
the concept and a partial listing 261 of cases. The court based its decision
on Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps 262 and Gertz v. Welch,263 two leading U.S.
Supreme Court cases involving individuals suing media defendants for libel
over statements regarding matters of public concern. In these types of cases,
advocates will find examples of courts finding—or not finding—that
matters of public concern were involved.
Second, the Texas libel statute provides a privilege against allegations of
libel and has protected discussion of certain “matters of public concern”
since 1901 without statutorily defining the term.264 While the statute
applies narrowly to publications by a “newspaper or other periodical,”265
decisions regarding its applicability may be useful for current or future
litigation. For example, the Texas Supreme Court held in Fitzjarrald v.
Panhandle Publishing Co.266 that “character and fitness to hold the office are
matters of general public concern.”267 In Newton v. The Dallas Morning
News,268 the court held the newspaper’s reporting of a dispute between a
city and a homeowner was privileged as “reasonable and fair comment or
criticism of the official acts of public officials and of other matters of general
public concern published for general information.”269 In Swate v.
Schiffers,270 the court held newspaper coverage of a doctor’s extensive
history of medical malpractice, disciplinary actions by the Texas Medical
Board, termination of hospital privileges, and assault were stories about

259. Ann C. Hodges, Matters of Public Concern Standard in Free Speech Cases, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 982 (Paul Finkelman ed., Routledge 2006) (emphasis added).
260. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011), and Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46
(1988), for cases involving claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
261. Brady v. Klentzman, 515 S.W.3d 878, 884 (Tex. 2016).
262. Phila. Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986).
263. Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 349–50 (1974).
264. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 73.002(a), (b)(1)(D), (2) (originating in 1901).
265. Id.
266. Fitzjarrald v. Panhandle Publ’g Co., 228 S.W.2d 499 (Tex. 1950).
267. Id. at 503.
268. Newton v. Dall. Morning News, 376 S.W.2d 396 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1964, no writ).
269. Id. at 400.
270. Swate v. Schiffers, 975 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied).
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“medical care for members of the public.”271 Thus, it constituted a matter
of public concern under the statute.272
A note of caution to courts and advocates: the prior definition of “matter
of public concern” used, for example, a single word—“health”—to describe
a topic that constituted a public concern, which led courts to construe the
statute such that the public element in public concern was essentially
eliminated.273 That is not the same manner in which the courts construed
the Texas libel privilege statute’s reference to matters of public concern.274
For example, in Swate, the doctor’s activities were described using terms
more like those commanded by Snyder and Connick.275 The doctor’s
behavior occurred over many years; public agencies were involved in
attempting to stop his malpractice,276 and he broadcasted his services over
a clandestine radio station located in Mexico. Thus, the “content, form, and
context” of the subject underlying the communications at issue in that case
implicated issues far exceeding the doctor’s or any patient’s private interests.
The prior TCPA’s conflation of these broader analyses into a single word
resulted in its excessive application. Courts and advocates should be aware
that the new law is intended to avoid such conflation.
Third, the anti-SLAPP laws of other states are possible sources for
illuminating factual circumstances that may or may not amount to matters
of public concern, especially those whose applicability is expressly tied to
state and federal constitutional rights.277 The Public Participation Project
maintains a chart278 that provides a good starting place for researching state

271. Id. at 77.
272. Id.
273. See Lippincott v. Whisenhunt, 462 S.W.3d 507, 509–10 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam) (holding
emails between two healthcare employees, which discussed potential wrongdoings by Whisenhunt,
involved matters of public concern because his ability to practice in healthcare affected the public).
274. See, e.g., Swate, 975 S.W.2d at 74, 77 (construing the definition broadly to include “medical
care”).
275. Compare id. at 75, 77 (distinguishing standards for libel actions between public and private
plaintiffs), with Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011) (distinguishing the importance of public and
private speech), and Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 138 (1983) (establishing different treatment for
speech made by private citizens on matters of public concern versus speech made by public employees
concerning private grievances).
276. See Swate, 975 S.W.2d at 74–75, 78 (describing the “negative media attention” focused on
Swate for a decade).
277. See State Anti-SLAPP Laws, supra note 28 (providing a graphic summarizing each state’s
anti-SLAPP law).
278. Id.
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anti-SLAPP laws and other helpful legal resources.279
V. EXEMPTIONS FROM THE TCPA: RETAINED AND NEW
The 2019 legislation retained the four unchanged exemptions of the prior
law while its amendments added a laundry list of fifteen new exemptions
from the statute. Going forward, nineteen types of cases will not be subject
to a motion to dismiss under the revised TCPA.
A. Exemptions Retained from the Old Law
•

Enforcement actions “brought in the name of [the] state or a
political subdivision of [the] state by the attorney general, a district
attorney, a criminal district attorney, or a county attorney;”280

•

“[A] legal action brought against a person primarily engaged in the
business of selling or leasing goods or services, if the statement or
conduct arises out of the sale or lease of goods, services, or an
insurance product, insurance services, or a commercial transaction
in which the intended audience is an actual or potential buyer or
customer;”281

•

“[A] legal action seeking recovery for bodily injury, wrongful death,
or survival or to statements made regarding that legal action;”282

•

“[A] legal action brought under the Insurance Code or arising out
of an insurance contract.”283

The commercial speech and personal injury exemptions in the original
TCPA, enacted in 2011, were included at the request of the Texas Trial
Lawyers Association (TTLA).284 The reference in the commercial speech
exception to “insurance services” and the Insurance Code exemption were

279. Legal Resources, PUB. PARTICIPATION PROJECT: FIGHTING FOR FREE SPEECH,
https://anti-slapp.org/legal-resources [https://perma.cc/8AUM-WGUP].
280. Formerly, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.§ 27.010(a), now id. § 27.010(a)(1).
281. Formerly, id. § 27.010(b), now, id. § 27.010(a)(2), referred to as the “commercial speech
exemption.”
282. Formerly, id. § 27.010(c), now, id. § 27.010(a)(3).
283. Formerly, id. § 27.010(d), now, id. § 27.010(a)(4).
284. Act of June 17, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 341, § 2, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 961 (amended
2019).
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added in 2013, again by the request of TTLA.285 During discussion of the
2019 amendments, TTLA sought and obtained agreement from the
stakeholders and legislators not to disturb the amendments it had requested
in the past.
B. Exemptions Added by the New Law
•

“[A] legal action “arising from an officer-director, employeeemployer, or independent contractor relationship that:
(A) [S]eeks recovery for misappropriation of:
[– T]rade secrets;286 or
[– C]orporate opportunities.287
(B) [S]eeks to enforce a:
[– N]on-disparagement agreement;288 or
[– A] covenant not to compete.”289

These exemptions were added at the request of the general business
community through the Texas Civil Justice League (TCJL) and Texans for
Lawsuit Reform (TLR). Note that these exemptions will only apply to suits
in which the parties are in one of the specified relationships with each other.
In the cases not described by the exemption, the TCPA may apply
depending on whether the communication at issue is covered by the exercise
of one of the rights to which the provisions authorizing a motion to dismiss
apply.
•

“[A] legal action filed under Title 1, 2, 4, or 5, Family Code, or an
application for a protective order under Chapter 7A, Code of
Criminal Procedure.”290

285. Act of June 14, 2013, 83d Leg., R.S., ch. 1042, § 3, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 2499 (amended
2019). Steve Bresnen represented TTLA in a lobbying capacity during both the 2011 and 2013
legislative sessions.
286. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.010(a)(5)(A).
287. Id.
288. Id. § 27.010(a)(5)(B).
289. Id.
290. Id. § 27.010(a)(6).
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The suits to which this exemption applies include marital relationships,
name changes, dating and family violence protective orders, and those
affecting the parent-child relationship (“SAPCRs”).291 In addition, the
exemption covers applications for protective orders involving certain sexual
and assaultive offenses under the Penal Code.292 By exempting family law
from the TCPA, the state legislature recognized the significant harm to one
or more parties that may be caused in cases where a TCPA motion to
dismiss results in inevitable delays.293 For example, the stay required by the
TCPA following a motion to dismiss filed shortly after the filing of a SAPCR
could prevent the court from issuing even temporary orders governing a
child’s living circumstances, child support, and the operation of a familyowned business until the motion is resolved, which could involve years of
appeals.294 Barring action on a protective order application could expose a
victim of sexual assault to further victimization by a perpetrator pending
resolution of the motion to dismiss.295
The Texas Family Law Foundation, a statewide nonprofit organization of
approximately 800 lawyers whose practices focus almost entirely on family
law, sought the family law exemption.296
•

“[A] legal action brought under Chapter 17, Business & Commerce
Code, other than an action governed by Section 17.49(a) of that
chapter.”297

291. Id.
292. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 7A authorizes protective order applications by adult
victims (or a parent or guardian acting behalf of a child victim) related to violations of Penal Code
§§ 20A.02 (trafficking of persons); 20A.03 (continuous trafficking of persons); 21.02 (continuous child
sexual abuse); 21.11 (indecency with a child); 22.011(sexual assault); 22.012 (indecent assault); 22.021
(aggravated sexual assault); 42.072 (stalking); and 43.05 (compelling prostitution).
293. See, e.g., H.B. 2730 Briefing Doc., supra note 49, at 2–4 (describing problems associated
with Texas’s anti-SLAPP statute in detail).
294. See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.003(b), (c) (addressing motions to dismiss under this chapter);
see generally Emily Miskel, Anti-SLAPP Dismissals: The Monster That Could Eat Your Case, in STATE BAR
OF TEXAS, 45TH ANNUAL ADVANCED FAMILY LAW COURSE 3–5 (2019) (discussing the TCPA
amendments of HB 2370 and procedures associated with TCPA motions to dismiss).
295. See Barlow v. Dinaali, No. E061915, 2016 WL 2893061, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. May 13, 2016)
(holding trial court did not err by not considering defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion filed in opposition
of a request for a restraining order).
296. TEX. FAM. L. FOUND., https://www.texasfamilylawfoundation.com/ [https://perma.cc/
J88G-VRQT].
297. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.010(a)(7).
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Chapter 17 addresses a diverse variety of specific deceptive trade
practices, including private use of the state seal,298 bogus going-out-ofbusiness sales,299 misusing certain containers300 and deceptive
advertising.301 At the heart of the chapter lies the Deceptive Trade
Practices—Consumer Protection Act302—which provides a laundry list
describing general principles and specific practices that are actionable under
that subchapter. In many of the listed deceptive trade practices,
communication is a central element of the unlawful act, such as, “representing
that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality, or grade, or that
goods are of a particular style or model, if they are of another.”303
Note that because of its reference to Section 17.49(a), Business and
Commerce Code, this exemption does not apply to suits against certain
media owners or employees involving advertising carried by them unless the
actor had knowledge that the advertising was deceptive or had a substantial
financial interest in the underlying good or service being advertised.304
Note also that there will likely be overlap between the commercial speech
exemption retained from the old law and the new exemption.
TTLA and the business community supported the exemption of
Chapter 17, Business and Commerce Code (with the exception of
Section 17.49(a)) from coverage under Chapter 27.305
•

“[A] legal action in which a moving party raises a defense pursuant
to Section 160.010, Occupations Code, Section 161.033, Health and
Safety Code, or the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986
(42 U.S.C. 11101 et seq.).”306

Each of the cited laws in this exemption relate to health care

298. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.08.
299. Id. § 17.11(c); see id. §§ 17.81–.93 (defining “going out of business sale”).
300. Id. § 17.29.
301. Id. § 17.12.
302. Id. §§ 17.41–.63.
303. Id. § 17.46(b)(7) (emphasis added).
304. See id. § 17.49(a) (discussing exemptions as they apply to the Deceptive Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection subchapter).
305. Amy and Steve Bresnen represented TTLA during the 2019 legislative session; see also
Bumjin Park v. Suk Baldwin Props., LLC, No. 03-18-00025-CV, 2018 WL 4905717, at *1–6 (Tex.
App.—Austin Oct. 10, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (applying the TCPA to a DTPA case).
306. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.010(a)(8).
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professionals’ immunity from liability regarding peer review and review by
medical committees of care in health care facilities.307
The Texas Medical Association and other healthcare-related trade
associations requested this exemption.
•

“[A]n eviction suit brought under Chapter 24, Property Code.”308

The Texas Apartment Association, speaking independently, and through
the TCJL,309 sought this exemption so that suits for eviction, intended to
allow prompt removal of delinquent tenants, would not be delayed by the
tenant filing a TCPA motion to dismiss, potentially allowing the tenant to
stay put, perhaps for years.
•

“[A] disciplinary action or disciplinary proceeding brought under
Chapter 81, Government Code, or the Texas Rules of Disciplinary
Procedure.”310

The State Bar of Texas sought the exemption after enforcing its
disciplinary rules against an attorney in district court in which the attorney
subsequently filed a TCPA motion to dismiss.311 While the courts held the
TCPA applied to the case, they also held the Bar had met its burden to show
a prima facie case so that the suit could go forward.312 Still, the case was

307. See H.B. 2730 Briefing Doc., supra note 49, at 6 (“Suits responding to medical peer reviews
will be excepted from the [Texas anti-SLAPP] statute.”); see also Mem’l Hermann Health Sys. v. Khalil,
No. 01-16-00512-CV, 2017 WL 3389645, at *9–12 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 8, 2017, pet.
denied) (mem. op.) (“[A] ‘health care entity that, without malice, participates in medical peer review or
furnishes records, information, or assistance to a medical peer review committee or the board is
immune from any civil liability arising from that act.’” (quoting TEX. OCC. CODE § 160.010(c))); Batra
v. Covenant Health Sys., 562 S.W.3d 696, 715 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2018, pet. denied) (“[A] cause of
action does not accrue against a member, agent, or employee of a medical peer review committee or
against a health care entity from any act, statement, determination or recommendation made or act
reported, without malice, in the course of medical peer review.”).
308. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.010(a)(9).
309. See H.B. 2730 Briefing Doc., supra note 49, at 1 (listing supporters of the “anti-SLAPP” bill
such as the Texas Apartment Association).
310. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.010(a)(10).
311. See generally Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline v. Rosales, 577 S.W.3d 305 (Tex. App.—Austin
2019, pet. denied) (holding “lawyer-discipline actions are not exempt from applicability of Texas
Citizens Participation Act (TCPA)”).
312. See id. at 315–16 (analyzing whether “the district court erred in granting the TCPA motion
to dismiss because the Commission met its burden of ‘establish[ing] by clear and specific evidence a
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delayed for months while this result was being reached.313
•

“[A] legal action brought under Chapter 554, Government
Code.”314

Chapter 554 protects government employees who report a government’s
violation of the law (i.e., whistleblowers) by authorizing them to bring a civil
lawsuit if the employer retaliates by taking an adverse employment action
against the employee in retaliation.315 A TCPA motion to dismiss will no
longer impede the employee’s cause of action. The Legislature added the
exemption for whistleblowers after hearing testimony during the House
Committee hearing on House Bill 2730.316
•

“[A] legal action based on a common law fraud claim.”317

To prove common law fraud, the plaintiff must prove the defendant
made a material misrepresentation and the plaintiff relied on the
misrepresentation,318 meaning a communication was made involving a
transaction between two parties. Under the prior definition of “matter of
public concern,” neither an allegation of material misrepresentation nor
reliance were required for the old TCPA to apply; the communication only
had to involve “an issue related to a good, product or service in the
marketplace.”319 The commercial speech exemption (unchanged by
H.B. 2730) was not limited to cases alleging material misrepresentation or

prima facie case for each essential element of the claim in question.’” (quoting CIV. PRAC. & REM.
§ 27.005(c))) (alteration in original).
313. See generally Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 577 S.W.3d at 305 (establishing delay experienced
by the court while reaching its decision).
314. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.010(a)(11).
315. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 554.008 (“A supervisor who in violation of this chapter
suspends or terminates the employment of a public employee or takes an adverse personnel action
against the employee is liable for a civil penalty not to exceed $15,000.”).
316. Tex. H.B. 2730 Before the House Comm. on Judiciary & Civil Jurisprudence, 86th Leg.,
R.S. GRANICUS (Apr. 1, 2019), https://tlchouse.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=44&clip
_id=16843.
317. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.010(a)(12).
318. See Zorilla v. Aypco Constr. II, LLC, 469 S.W. 3d 143, 153 (Tex. 2015) (defining a
“common-law fraud claim”); see also Better Bus. Bureau of Metro. Hous., Inc. v. John Moore Servs.,
Inc., 441 S.W.3d 345, 358 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (listing elements which
deem a person committed fraud).
319. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.001(7)(E) (expired Aug. 31, 2019) (emphasis added).
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reliance.320 The broadly-stated exemption limited the broadly-stated
definition.321 Under the new definition, it is clear there will be no TCPA
protection for cases of common law fraud and cases alleging other theories
of liability involving transactions in goods, products, and services will
continue to be covered by the statute’s commercial speech exemption.322
VI. PROTECTIONS FOR THE MEDIA, ASSAULT VICTIMS AND OTHERS
Having reached an agreement to carve an additional eleven types of cases
from the TCPA’s coverage, as well as barring governmental entities from
utilizing its motion to dismiss, the Legislature recognized those exemptions
might also sweep too broadly.323 It used exceptions to the exemptions to
reinstate coverage of the TCPA to selected types of cases.324 California had
used the same technique when—following abuses of its original law—it
reformed its “anti-SLAPP statute” by describing cases to which the statute
would not apply and then enacting exceptions to those exceptions,325
including for the media, an all-important industry in that state.
A. The Media Provision326
Since at least New York Times v. Sullivan, First Amendment jurisprudence
has recognized the media’s unique role in society. The Texas Legislature
has substantially immunized some of the media by statutorily defining
“libel” and providing privileges, defenses to liability, procedures to mitigate
320. See id. 27.010(a)(2) (detailing the commercial speech exemption).
321. Id.
322. See id. § 27.010(a)(12) (stating “this chapter does not apply to . . . a legal action based on a
common law fraud claim”); id. § 27.010(a)(2).
323. See id. § 27.010(a)(1)–(12) (showing additional types of cases that do not apply this chapter).
324. See generally id. § 27.010(a)–(b) (showing the current exemptions of this chapter effective
Sept. 1, 2019).
325. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.17 (West 2012). Subsection 425.17(a) provides:
The Legislature finds and declares that there has been a disturbing abuse of Section 425.16, the
California Anti-SLAPP Law, which has undermined the exercise of the constitutional rights of
freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances, contrary to the purpose and intent
of Section 425.16. The Legislature finds and declares that it is in the public interest to encourage
continued participation in matters of public significance, and that this participation should not be
chilled through abuse of the judicial process or Section 425.16.
326. See generally CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.010(b)(1) (“[D]ramatic, literary, musical, political,
journalistic, or otherwise artistic work, including audio-visual work regardless of the means of
distribution, a motion picture, a television or radio program, or an article published in a newspaper,
website, magazine, or other platform, no matter the method or extent of distribution[.]”).
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liability,327 and interlocutory appeals in certain cases.328 The new antiSLAPP law provides yet another method of recognizing the media’s unique
function.
By contrast with every other state’s “anti-SLAPP statute”—including
California329—the new Texas law provides far broader protections for the
media.330 The very function of a media entity involves either preparing to
speak, speaking, or conveying the speech of others to the public, making
those entities uniquely exposed to litigation in response to their activities.
As an express exception to three of the exemptions, the media provision
may be somewhat confusing, requiring careful study by courts and advocates
going forward.331
Comprised of a single sentence containing 146 words, 32 commas,
1 colon, and 1 semi-colon, it may be helpful to break the provision down
into its critical parts:
1. The provision applies to “a legal action against a person arising from
any act of that person” described in the provision.332 The word
“person” includes individuals and any type of legal entity.333 The
language covers the individual who writes a screenplay, as well as the
companies that produce and distribute the film made from the
writer’s work.
2. The TCPA will continue to apply notwithstanding three expressed
exceptions because the conduct described by each exemption
involves communications frequently conveyed by or through a media

327. See generally id. §§ 73.001–.006 (offering guidance on the Texas Legislature’s definition and
understanding of “libel”).
328. See id. § 51.014(a)(12) (“A person may appeal from an interlocutory order of a district court,
county court at law, statutory probate court, or county court that denies a motion to dismiss filed under
Section 27.003.”).
329. CAL. CIV. PROC. § 425.17 (d).
330. See Anti-SLAPP Laws, PUB. PARTICIPATION PROJECT: FIGHTING FOR FREE SPEECH,
https://anti-slapp.org (hover over the “Our Work” link; click the “State Anti-SLAPP Laws” link; click
the “State Anti-SLAPP Reference Chart” link) [https://perma.cc/M8JF-P73T] (providing a state antiSLAPP Reference Chart).
331. See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.010(b).
332. Id. § 27.010(b)(1).
333. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.005(2) (“‘Person’ includes corporation, organization,
government or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership,
association, and any other legal entity.”).
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entity.334 Specifically, the TCPA will apply to a suit against a media
defendant based on communication covered by the:
A. commercial speech exemption;335
B. deceptive trade practices exemption;336 and
C. fraud exemption.337
3. The media provision applies to both public and private acts of the
media defendant.338
4. The provision applies to acts “related to the gathering, receiving,
posting, or processing of information for communication to the
public . . . .”339 Even activities that precede any communication, such
as gathering and receiving information in preparation for
communication, are covered by the provision.340 For example,
claims of invasion of privacy by a news organization’s investigation
of a story would be covered by the provision.
5. The provision applies even though no information is actually
communicated to the public and regardless of “the method or extent
of distribution.”341
6. The provision applies to the “creation, dissemination, exhibition, or
advertisement or other similar promotion of” the communication at
issue.342 Again, creating a story would precede its exhibition, as
would pre-publication promotion of the story. However, both

334. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.010(b)(1).
335. Id. § 27.010(a)(2).
336. Id. § 27.010(a)(7).
337. Id. § 27.010(a)(12).
338. See id. § 27.010(b)(1) (“[T]his chapter applies to a legal action . . . against a person arising
from any act of that person, whether public or private . . . .”).
339. Id. § 27.010(b)(1) (emphasis added).
340. Id.; see Tamkin v. CBS Broad., Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 264, 273 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (“[E]ach
time the defamatory statement is communicated to a third person who understands its defamatory
meaning as applied to the plaintiff, the statement is said to have been ‘published,’ although a written
dissemination, as suggested by the common meaning of that term, is not required.”).
341. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.010(b)(1) (emphasis added). But see Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 752–53 (1985) (recognizing the limited extent of distribution
of the information at issue led the Vermont Supreme Court to hold a constitutionally protected matter
of public concern was not present).
342. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.010(b)(1).
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activities would likewise be covered by the provision, as well as
advertising the story after its publication.
7. The covered activities must be performed in relation to a “dramatic,
literary, musical, political, journalistic, or otherwise artistic work,
including audio-visual work regardless of the means of distribution, a
motion picture, a television or radio program, or an article published
in a newspaper, website, magazine, or other platform, no matter the
method . . . of distribution[.]”343
This all-inclusive language has two components: (a) the kinds of works
covered by the provision and (b) a non-exclusive list of various mediums by
which a communication may be conveyed. There will undoubtedly be cases
in which advocates assert a particular work (e.g., subject matter that
constitutes pornography or the Internet blog of a person interested in
football) is not described by the words “dramatic, literary, musical, political,
journalistic, or otherwise artistic work . . . .”344 But, the language should
substantially reduce or eliminate disputes regarding whether a particular type
of medium used for communicating is covered by the provision.
A number of exemptions, however, are not undone by the media
provision. For example, based on the family law exception, screenwriters
cannot avail themselves of the TCPA in divorce proceedings merely because
they work for a media organization.345 If a journalist racing to the scene of
a newsworthy event runs over a pedestrian, the resulting personal injury suit
against the driver and the news outlet that employs the journalist will not be
subject to the TCPA.346 An insurance company cannot invoke the TCPA
in a suit by a Broadway producer against the company that wrote the
business interruption insurance for a play canceled due to an insured
cause.347 And, a media company whose ideas for a new film were
misappropriated by a former employee will not see its suit against the

343. Id.
344. Id.
345. See id. § 27.010(a)(6) (“This chapter does not apply to . . . a legal action filed under Title 1,
2, 4, or 5, Family Code, or . . . Code of Criminal Procedure[.]”).
346. See id. § 27.010(a)(3) (“This chapter does not apply to . . . a legal action seeking recovery
for bodily injury, wrongful death, or survival or to statements made regarding that legal action[.]”).
347. See id. § 27.010(a)(4) (“This chapter does not apply to . . . a legal action brought under the
Insurance Code or arising out of an insurance contract[.]”).
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employee subjected to a TCPA motion to dismiss.348
Just as the new TCPA’s treatment of public concern emphasizes the
public element, the boundaries between when the media provision will and
will not apply represent the Legislature’s recognition of the media as media
versus private individuals and business entities in non-media roles. In its
unique role, the media will receive the benefit of the TCPA’s motion to
dismiss and related provisions. In its roles as individuals and business
entities, media members will be treated as all other persons are treated.
Due to the kind of twist of fate that often makes the legislative process
interesting, AT&T’s Texas leadership ended up playing a central role in
defining the demarcation between the interests of the media as media and
the interests of corporate entities irrespective of their status as media
entities.349 House Bill 2730 was filed just two days after AT&T prevailed
at the federal Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit against the United States
Justice Department Antitrust Division’s attempt to block the company’s
proposed merger with Time Warner, one of the world’s largest media and
entertainment companies, the holdings of which include CNN, HBO and
Overnight, a “simple” wireless carrier—
Warner Brothers.350
headquartered in Dallas, one of Texas’s largest and most influential
employers and a leading member of the Texas Civil Justice League—became
a media giant with global reach.351 Wearing both corporate and media hats
put AT&T in a truly unique position.
Public discussion of the Legislature’s consideration of major reforms to
the TCPA immediately became of critical interest to the company. AT&T’s

348. See id. § 27.010(a)(5)(A) (“This chapter does not apply to . . . a legal action arising from an
officer-director, employee-employer, or independent contractor relationship that seeks recovery for
misappropriation of trade secrets or corporate opportunities[.]”).
349. See generally House Res. Org., Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 2730, 86th Leg., R.S. (2019) (clarifying
changes and aspects of revising the TCPA).
350. See Edmund Lee & Cecilia Kang, U.S. Loses Appeal Seeking to Block AT&T-Time Warner
Merger, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/26/business/media/atttime-warner-appeal.html [https://perma.cc/V59T-D8ZH] (reporting “the merger between AT&T and
Time Warner has already begun to reshape much of the media industry”).
351. See AT&T Takes Crown from Exxon As Largest Dallas-Area Company in Market Value,
DALL. BUS. J. (Jan. 24, 2020, 1:24 PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/dallas/news/2020/01/24/at-texxon.html [https://perma.cc/WC2X-LNFX] (“The Dallas area may still have a reputation for big oil,
but it[ i]s AT&T taking the title of biggest local company over Exxon by one measure.”).
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leaders in Austin352 began to hear from their new media partners from
across the country, who were alerted to the issue by their colleagues at the
Motion Picture Association of America, the Texas Association of
Broadcasters (TAB), and the Texas Press Association (TPA).353 TAB and
TPA “came out swinging” against any change to the old TCPA even before
House Bill 2730 was filed.354
AT&T Texas, deeply engaged in the Texas economy and state politics,
recognized the need for change. Its interests as a major employer were
affected by issues such as the difficulties of enforcing noncompete
agreements and protecting trade secrets, necessitating changes in the old
TCPA. Its interests as a newly-minted media company required ensuring
protections under the old law remained an effective shield.
Building on the California anti-SLAPP statute’s media provision,355 the
company’s leadership secured the necessary legislative support of the antiSLAPP protections for the media and effectively neutralized the significant
opposition originally presented by TAB and TPA, ultimately bringing them
into support of the final bill.356 Working with other non-media participants
in the negotiations, the company helped to construct carefully targeted
exemptions from the TCPA applicable to general corporate and legal
participants’ interests while preserving the heart of the TCPA: the
protection of constitutional rights.
352. See Leslie Ward, AT&T SOUTHWEST, https://southwestregion.att.com/team/leslie-ward/
[https://perma.cc/V6D5-T98S] (“Leslie Ward, the president of AT&T Texas, works closely with
community and business leaders, elected officials and others at AT&T to continue bringing the most
advanced communications and entertainment technologies and services to Texas communities.”); see
also Mr. Jon David ‘David’ Tate, ST. B. TEX., https://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?
Section=Find_A_Lawyer&template=/Customsource/MemberDirectory/MemberDirectoryDetail.cf
m&ContactID=154334 [https://perma.cc/NJ6A-5GW3] (providing practice information about Mr.
Tate, Vice-President and Associate General Counsel for AT&T).
353. See Free Speech Advocates Mobilize to Protect Texas Anti-SLAPP Law, TEX. ASS’N OF
BROADCASTERS (Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.tab.org/news-and-events/news/free-speechadvocates-mobilize-to-protect-texas-anti-slapp-law [https://perma.cc/C3T3-9ZKE] (discussing
mobilization of free speech advocates in Texas).
354. What Are SLAPP Lawsuits and Why Do You Need a Law to Protect You from Them?, CALLER
TIMES (Feb. 15, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.caller.com/story/opinion/2019/02/15/what-slappsuits-and-why-do-you-need-protection-them/2861484002/ [https://perma.cc/QKZ7-G7ME] (“As
of this writing, no bill has been filed, but the table has been set. News organizations in Texas, including
this one, stand ready to oppose it.”); see H.B. 2730, TEX. LEGIS. ONLINE,
https://capitol.texas.gov/BillLookup/History.aspx?LegSess=86R&Bill=HB2730 [https://perma.cc/
NP7Q-84Z6] (reporting H.B. 2730 as filed on February 28, 2019).
355. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.17(d) (West 2012).
356. Sen. Comm. Rep., Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 2730, 86th Leg., R.S. (2019) (witness list).
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B. The “Yelp” Provision
A second aspect of the media exception to three of Chapter 27’s
exemptions is the so-called “consumer review” provision.357 This
amendment was sought on behalf of Yelp,358 a regional unit of the Better
Business Bureau (BBB), and similar businesses, which opposed the bill as
filed. Yelp, specifically, was concerned that certain types of relevant media
might not be covered by the proposed amendments to the TCPA.
Yelp hosts online reviews by consumers regarding their opinions of
various businesses, goods, and services.359 The BBB rates businesses based
on comments from third parties and used the older TCPA to its
advantage.360 As enacted, the commercial speech, deceptive trade, and
fraud exemptions will not apply to suits described by the consumer review
provision; i.e., the TCPA will apply.361
C. Protections for Victims of Assault and Other Crimes
The Texas Council on Family Violence and Texans Against Sexual
Assault requested the 2019 legislation add Section 27.010(c).362 These
victims’ rights organizations were concerned that perpetrators would sue
their victims if the victim spoke publicly or privately about the offenses, and
whether the victim initiated or responded to a communication made by the
perpetrator.363
While positioned in the section of the TCPA labeled “Exemptions,” the
TCPA will apply in these cases without regard to any exemption. The
provision applies to suits against victims—or alleged victims—of family or
357. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.010(b)(2) (“[T]his chapter applies to . . . a
legal action against a person related to the communication, gathering, receiving, posting, or processing
of consumer opinions or commentary, evaluations of consumer complaints, or reviews or ratings of
businesses.”).
358. YELP, https://www.yelp.com/ [https://perma.cc/7AFD-TNAQ].
359. See Duchouquette v. Prestigious Pets, LLC, No. 05-16-01163-CV, 2017 WL 5109341, at *1
(Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 6, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op) (“[T]he Duchouquettes filed a TCPA motion to
dismiss claiming that the Yelp review was an exercise of free speech and requesting attorneys’ fees and
sanctions.”).
360. See generally John Moore Servs. v. Better Bus. Bureau, No. 01-14-00906-CV, 2016 WL
3162206, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 2, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“John Moore sued
the Bureau alleging that it was harmed by the Bureau’s publication of an unfavorable online review.”).
361. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.010(a)–(b).
362. E-mail from Christopher Kaiser, (Past) Dir. of Public Policy/General Counsel, Texas
Association Against Sexual Assault, to Amy Bresnen and Steve Bresnen (Mar. 28, 2019, 4:08 PM) (on
file with authors).
363. Id.
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dating violence364 or a list of enumerated crimes in the kidnapping, sexual
assault, and human trafficking provisions of the Penal Code365 if the suit is
“based on or in response to a . . . communication.” The provision will apply
regardless of whether the communication is public or private.366 For
example, if a victim tells a friend in a private discussion that the victim has
been abused and the alleged abuser, having learned of the communication,
sues the victim for defamation based on it, the victim will be able to rely on
the anti-SLAPP statute.
VII. PROCEDURAL AMENDMENTS
A. The Motion to Dismiss: Eligible Filers Under the New TCPA
The new law struck the phrase “relates to” in order to narrow the
definition of “matter of public concern”; the same occurred to narrow the
application of Section 27.003, the “motion to dismiss” provision of the
TCPA.367 Many jurists opined about the extraordinary breadth of this
phrase, after the Texas Supreme Court rejected the assertion that it required
“something more than a tenuous or remote relationship.”368 Under the
new law, a legal action for which the motion to dismiss is eligible must be
“based on or in response to” the movant’s exercise of one of the protected
364. See generally TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 71.001–.007 (offering clarification of the provision
and its definitions under Chapter 71).
365. See generally TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 20.01–.07 (addressing the kidnapping, unlawful
restraint and smuggling of persons); see id. §§ 20A.01–.04 (covering the trafficking of persons); id.
§§ 21.01–.19 (discussing sexual offenses); id. §§ 22.01–.12 (outlining assaultive offenses).
366. See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.010(c) (“This chapter applies to a legal action against a victim
or alleged victim of family violence or dating violence . . . based on or in response to a public or private
communication.”).
367. See Pinkerton Law Firm, PLLC v. Univ. Cancer Ctr., Inc., No. 01-19-00089-CV, 2020 WL
97173, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 9, 2020, pet. filed); see also Senate Research Ctr., Bill
Analysis, Tex. H.B. 2973, 82d Leg., R.S. (2011) (“Effective date: upon passage or September 1, 2011.”);
cf. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.003(a) (codifying amendments to the “motion to dismiss” provision of the
TCPA).
368. Grant v. Pivot Tech. Sols., Ltd., 556 S.W.3d 865, 880 (Tex. App.—Austin 2018, pet.
denied) (“[T]he Texas Supreme Court has rejected the assertion that the plain language of the phrase
[relates to], which includes no qualification as to its limits, requires ‘something more than a tenuous or
remote relationship.’” (quoting Cavin v. Abbott, 545 S.W.3d 47, 63 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, pet.
denied))); see also Robert B. James, DDS, Inc. v. Elkins, 553 S.W.3d 596, 604 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2018, pet. denied) (“Conversely, the Legislature declined to use a broader qualifying phrase like ‘relates
to.’ In the insurance contract exemption, the Legislature purposefully used the phrase ‘arising out of’
and not ‘based on,’ ‘brought under,’ or ‘relates to.’” (quoting Cadena Comercial USA Corp. v. Tex.
Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 518 S.W.3d 318, 325–26 (Tex. 2017))).
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rights or “arise[] from” an activity to which the media provision applies.369
The motion to dismiss provision was also narrowed by prohibiting
governmental entities, or an official or public employee acting in an official
capacity, from filing such a motion.370 This change was the result of
concern by some stakeholders that a governmental entity could file a TCPA
motion to dismiss in an attempt to intentionally and inappropriately
sequester information from the public.371
B. Timing, Burdens, and the Effects of Dismissal Under the New TCPA

Timing: Under the old law, a party had sixty days after the date of service
to file a TCPA motion to dismiss,372 unless the court extended the time
upon a showing of good cause. The timing for filing the motion was
changed to allow the parties, upon mutual agreement, to extend the time to
file the motion to dismiss.373
Two other new timing requirements were also added. The first requires
the movant to give the non-moving party written notice of the date and time
of the hearing at least twenty-one days beforehand unless the parties agree
or the court orders otherwise.374 The second requires the nonmovant’s
response to the motion to be filed at least seven days before the hearing,
unless agreed by the parties or a court orders otherwise.375
Finally, the old law required a court to decide the motion within thirty
days “following the date of the hearing.”376 The current law more
specifically ties the thirty-day timeframe to the date the hearing “concludes,”
which takes into account a multi-day hearing.377 These changes were made

369. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.003(a).
370. See id. (“A party under this section does not include a government entity, agency, or an
official or employee acting in an official capacity.”).
371. See generally Roach v. Ingram, 557 S.W.3d 203, 219, 225 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2018, pet. denied) (holding the court properly dismissed parents’ claims because the defendants
satisfied their burden under the TCPA to demonstrate the lawsuit related to the “exercise of the right
to free speech concerning communications ‘made in connection with’ . . . the enforcement of truancy
laws and the operation of the Truancy Court,” and the “request for declaratory and prospective
injunctive relief concerning alleged ultra vires acts and violations of due process [were] moot” (quoting
CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.003(a))).
372. In re Estate of Check, 438 S.W.3d 829, 832 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.).
373. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.003(b).
374. Id. § 27.003(d).
375. Id. § 27.003(e).
376. Id. § 27.005(a) (expired Aug. 31, 2019).
377. Id.
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to encourage a prompt process and align more closely with conventional
summary-judgment rules.378
Burdens of proof: Under the old law, the provision for pre-trial dismissal
of claims made the statute arguably vulnerable to a constitutional attack379
because courts were required to apply burdens of proof and affirmative
defenses without evidence or juries. The nonmovant’s burden to provide
“clear and specific” evidence for each essential element of the claim meant
a nonmovant was required to set forth a minimum quantum of evidence.380
Nevertheless, the movant could prevail by establishing each essential
element of a valid defense to the nonmovant’s claim by a “preponderance
of the evidence.”381
This allocation of burdens was problematic. In most defamation cases,
for example, the defendant asserts the affirmative defense of “truth.”382
However, under the old TCPA, the trial court could “consider the pleadings
and supporting and opposing affidavits”383 but could not hear testimony.
Coupled with the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, a court would
essentially be required to determine whether the defendant was telling the
378. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c) (“Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion for summary
judgment shall state the specific grounds therefor. Except on leave of court, with notice to opposing
counsel, the motion and any supporting affidavits shall be filed and served at least twenty-one days
before the time specified for hearing. Except on leave of court, the adverse party, not later than seven
days prior to the day of hearing may file and serve opposing affidavits or other written response.”)
379. See Justin M. Waggoner, Challenging the TCPA on Grounds that It Violates the Right to Trial by
Jury, 84 ST. B. LITIG. SEC. REP: ADVOC. 54, 54 (2018) (“This article explores the possibility of a
constitutional challenge to the TCPA that may present an avenue for defeating particular types of
TCPA motions that does not require meeting the statute’s potentially burdensome procedural
requirements at an early stage of the lawsuit, before discovery is commenced . . . .”); see also Washington
Supreme Court Strikes Down Anti-SLAPP Law As Unconstitutional, REPS. COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM
PRESS (May 28, 2015), https://www.rcfp.org/washington-supreme-court-strikes-down-anti-slapplaw-unconstitutiona/ [https://perma.cc/JG8J-5Z52] (“The decision marks the first time an antiSLAPP law has been held unconstitutional.”); see also Minnesota, REPS. COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM
PRESS,
https://www.rcfp.org/anti-slapp-guide/minnesota/
[https://perma.cc/ECZ8-LQ6T]
(“Minnesota adopted anti-SLAPP legislation in 1994. However, in 2016, a state appellate court found
the statute unconstitutional . . . .”).
380. See In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 587 (Tex. 2015) (summarizing how some Texas courts
required a “heightened evidentiary standard, unaided by inferences”).
381. See Campone v. Kline, No. 03-16-00854-CV, 2018 WL 3652231, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin
Aug. 2, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“If the nonmovant makes such a showing, the trial court will still
dismiss the action if the movant ‘establishes by a preponderance of the evidence each essential element
of a valid defense’ to the nonmovant’s claim.” (quoting CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.005(d))).
382. See id. at *5 (summarizing the defendant’s motion to dismiss as containing a “truth”
defense).
383. Senate Research Ctr., Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 2730, 86th Leg., R.S. (2019).
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truth based solely on pleadings (not traditionally considered to be
“evidence”) and affidavits, replacing the jury’s constitutional fact-finding
function.384 The standards of the old law made it more difficult to survive
a pre-discovery motion to dismiss than to survive a post-discovery motion
for summary judgment. Doubts as to whether this arrangement violated the
“right of trial by jury,”385 or access to the courts,386 or simply created an
absurd yet constitutionally permissible result were reason enough to amend
Section 27.005(d).387 The prior statute’s breadth led to an inordinate
amount of non-frivolous claims facing a TCPA motion to dismiss. Yet, those
very claims were limited to non-jury disposition with a limited evidentiary
record and no live testimony.388
The “preponderance of evidence” standard was removed from the TCPA
in its entirety to reduce these concerns. In its place, in Section 27.005(b),
the court must dismiss the nonmovant’s claim if the moving party
“demonstrates that the legal action is based on or is in response to . . . the
[moving] party’s right[s] of” free speech, petition, right of association, or
that the media provision covers the claim.389 Once again, the phrase
“relates to” was stricken from Section 27.005(b), narrowing the provision’s
application and increasing consistency within the chapter.390 Although the
word “demonstrates” is not defined in the new law, courts will not have
unfettered discretion. Whether a case is one to which the TCPA applies is
a question of law, which is properly an issue for the court.391 The statutory
definitions and evidentiary provisions governing the nonmovant’s prima
facie case and the movant’s defenses will determine whether to grant a
motion to dismiss. Moreover, questions of law regarding the applicability
384. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.006(a) (expired Aug. 31, 2019); id. § 27.005(b).
385. TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 15; id. art. 5, § 10; see also State Farm Lloyds v. Nicolau, 951 S.W.2d
444, 455 (Tex. 1997) (explaining the separate roles of judges and juries regarding factfinding).
386. See Combined Law Enf’t Ass’ns of Tex. v. Sheffield, No. 03-13-00105-CV, 2014 WL
411672, at *11 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 31, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding the old TCPA did
not violate the Texas Constitution’s open-courts provision).
387. See Waggoner, supra note 379, at 54–57 (discussing legal challenges faced by the application
of Section 27.005(d)); see also Mihalic v. City of Houston, No. 01-90-00968-CV, 1991 WL 119198, at *3
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 3, 1991, no writ) (not designated for publication) (“Where facts
are disputed, defenses ‘in bar’ are not properly disposed of at a preliminary hearing before the court,
unless the parties agree or the summary judgment procedure is utilized.”).
388. Waggoner, supra note 379, at 54–57.
389. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.005(b).
390. Compare id. § 27.005(b), with id. (expired June 13, 2013) (including “related to” language).
391. See generally J.L. Clark, A Mixed Question of Law and Fact, 18 YALE L.J. 404 (1908–1909)
(defining a mixed question of law and fact).
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of the chapter and the trial court’s conclusions are subject to de novo
appellate review.392
Under the old law, Section 27.005(d) provided for dismissal of the case if
the movant established “by a preponderance of the evidence each essential
element of a valid defense to the nonmovant’s claim.”393 Under the new
version of that section, a court must dismiss an action if the moving party
“establishes an affirmative defense or other grounds on which the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”394 The statute does not
define what is meant by the word “establishes.”395
The new law also expands the types of information—and possibly the
amount of information—the court can consider when determining whether
an action is “subject to”396 Chapter 27 and whether dismissal is
appropriate.397 In addition to courts considering the pleadings in the case
and supporting and opposing affidavits, a court now must accept the types
of evidence allowed under the summary-judgment rule: deposition
transcripts, interrogatory answers, admissions, stipulations of the parties,
and authenticated or certified public records.398
The prior statute gave little or no practical guidance about the amount of
discovery to allow before disposing of a TCPA motion to dismiss, stating
only that “the court may allow specified and limited discovery relevant to
the motion.”399 The 2019 legislation did not amend this language.
Consequently, the scope of discovery under the TCPA is limited only in that
it must target revealing information relevant to the motion. In contrast, the
amount of discovery must be “specified and limited”—a phrase which may
be subject to debate. Notably, a court’s decision regarding the extent of
discovery allowed is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review on
appeal.400
392. See id. at 412 (“The truth is the mixed question is not a sound philosophical principle in
jurisprudence, but a mere subterfuge which affords courts an opportunity to review the evidence on
appeal without appearing to do so.”).
393. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.005(d) (expired Aug. 31, 2019).
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id. § 27.006(a) (showing “subject to” was added to ensure both movants and nonmovants
will not be limited in the evidence allowed under the second and third “prongs” of the TCPA analysis).
397. Id.
398. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c).
399. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.006(b).
400. See In re SSCP Mgmt., Inc., 573 S.W.3d 464, 469 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2019, no pet.)
(“A clear failure by the trial court to analyze or apply the law correctly constitutes an abuse of
discretion.” (citing Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992, orig. proceeding))).
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In the discovery rules themselves, relevance is a fairly broad concept. A
party can seek to discover any information that appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.401 Case law, on
the other hand, prohibits fishing expeditions.402 One might assume
discovery that would reasonably lead to evidence tending to prove an
element of the plaintiff’s prima facie case is relevant to the disposition of a
motion to dismiss and not a fishing expedition. Court decisions preceding
the 2019 amendments to the Act appear to support this conclusion, at least
to some extent.403
Does the new reference to summary-judgment evidence actually expand
the amount of discovery that should be allowed in a TCPA battle? Allowing
Rule 166a evidence that may be obtained by relatively unburdensome

401. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a) (“In general, a party may obtain discovery regarding any matter
that is not privileged and is relevant to the subject matter of the pending action, whether it relates to
the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or the claim or defense of any other party.”).
402. See Loftin v. Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Tex. 1989) (prohibiting use of request for
production to fish for evidence); see also In re Alford Chevrolet-Geo, 997 S.W.2d 173, 180–81 (Tex.
1999) (“[D]iscovery may not be used as a fishing expedition . . . .”); In re Am. Optical Corp., 988 S.W.2d
711, 713 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam) (“This Court has repeatedly emphasized that discovery may not be
used as a fishing expedition.”); K Mart Corp. v. Sanderson, 937 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Tex. 1996) (per
curiam) (“We reject the notion that any discovery device can be used to ‘fish.’”); Texaco, Inc. v.
Sanderson, 898 S.W.2d 813, 815 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam) (“Parties must have some latitude in
fashioning proper discovery requests. The request in this case is not close; it is well outside the bounds
of proper discovery. It is not merely an impermissible fishing expedition; it is an effort to dredge the
lake in hopes of finding a fish.”); Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Hall, 909 S.W.2d 491, 492 (Tex. 1995)
(per curiam) (“This is the very kind of ‘fishing expedition’ that is not allowable . . . .”); see also In re Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 123 S.W.3d 573, 578 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (defining an
improper “fishing expedition” as “one aimed not as supporting existing claims but at finding new
ones”); In re Am. Home Assurance Co., 88 S.W.3d 370, 376 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, orig.
proceeding) (“[D]iscovery undertaken with the purpose of finding an issue, rather than in support of
an issue already raised by the pleadings, would constitute an impermissible ‘fishing expedition’ . . . .”).
403. See, e.g., In re SSCP Mgmt., Inc., 573 S.W.3d at 472 (“Like our sister courts of appeals, we
recognize that ‘[s]ome merits-based discovery may also be relevant . . . to the extent it seeks
information to assist the non-movant to meet its burden to present a prima facie case for each element
of the non-movant’s claims to defeat the motion to dismiss.’ However, any merits-based discovery
that is necessarily implicated by discovery relevant to the motion to dismiss ‘must still be “specified
and limited” because a prima facie standard generally “requires only the minimum quantum of evidence
necessary to support a rational inference that the allegation of fact is true.”’ Presumably, the nonmoving party, even after showing ‘good cause’ supporting its need for discovery relevant to the motion
to dismiss, would ‘not need multiple or lengthy depositions or voluminous written discovery in
order to meet the low threshold to present a prima facie case.’”) (alteration in original) (citations
omitted).
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procedures, such as through admissions and interrogatories, in a given case
would be consistent with the TCPA’s policy of protecting the exercise of
constitutional rights by reducing litigation burdens while “at the same time,
protect[ing] the rights of a person to file meritorious lawsuits for
demonstrable injury”404—another of the TCPA’s stated purposes.
Acquiring and presenting public records that are authenticated or certified
can be done with virtually no burden on the opposing party and should be
allowed as a matter of course. As a practical matter, the TCPA’s time limit
for holding the hearing on the motion to dismiss—at most 120 days after
service of the motion, when discovery has been allowed405—will necessarily
limit any tendency to engage in a fishing expedition.
Just as the notice and timing requirements of the new law moved TCPA’s
procedures closer to summary-judgment practice, the changes to
Section 27.005 clarify the standards of proof by making them akin to
summary-judgment standards of review406 and create a more rational
alignment between the statute and constitutional rights of access to the
courts407 and jury trials.408 By doing so, the 2019 amendments likely
further insulate the TCPA from constitutional attack on open courts and
right to trial by jury grounds.409 Notably, while the new statute moves the
process in the direction of summary judgment, it does not expressly include
summary judgment’s requirement that there be “no genuine issue as to any
material fact”410 for the dismissal of the case. Nonetheless, by opening
avenues to discovery of summary-judgment evidence, a showing of material
facts relevant to a motion to dismiss may be easier for the parties, and
404. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.002.
405. Id. § 27.004(c)
406. See Batra v. Covenant Health Sys., 562 S.W.3d 696, 708 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2018, pet.
denied) (applying “a standard of review that is essentially equivalent to a motion for summary judgment
on an affirmative defense”).
407. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13.
408. Id. § 15.
409. See Davis v. Cox, 351 P.3d 862, 875 (Wash. 2015) (ruling Washington’s anti-SLAPP statute
violates the state’s constitutional right to trial by jury); Leiendecker v. Asian Women United of Minn.,
895 N.W.2d 623, 636 (Minn. 2017) (deciding Minnesota’s anti-SLAPP statute violates the state’s
constitutional right to trial by jury). For an in-depth discussion of the TCPA as it relates to these and
other constitutional issues, see Mark C. Walker, The Texas Anti-SLAPP Law and the Texas Defamation
Mitigation Act: Essential Navigation Charts, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS CLE, ADVANCED CIVIL TRIAL
COURSE 64 (2018) (observing the reasoning in Combined Law Enforcement Association of Texas v. Sheffield,
No. 03-13-00105-CV, 2014 WL 411672 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 31, 2014, pet. denied), was undercut
by the holding in Sullivan v. Abraham, 488 S.W.3d 294 (Tex. 2016)).
410. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c)(ii).
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disputes about those facts may be reduced or eliminated beyond what was
made possible by the prior law’s reliance on pleadings and affidavits alone.
Effects of decisions on motions to dismiss: House Bill 2730 added a
new provision that addresses the effects of decisions on motions to dismiss
regarding other aspects of the case: “Neither the court’s ruling on the
motion nor the fact that it made such a ruling shall be admissible in evidence
at any later stage of the case, and no burden of proof or degree of proof
otherwise applicable shall be affected by the ruling.”411 Thus, early rulings
on TCPA motions to dismiss cannot have res judicata effects or even be
introduced or considered later in the proceedings.412
C. Sanctions Are No Longer Mandatory: Attorney’s Fees and Costs Are
Under the old law, if a nonmovant failed to meet her burden for
establishing a prima facie case by supporting every element of her claim by
clear and specific evidence, she would not only have to pay the movant’s
attorney’s fees and court costs but mandatory sanctions, as well.413
Moreover, there was confusion about whether a court’s failure to award
sanctions was an abuse of discretion and whether it was sufficient to award
a nominal sanction of one dollar.414
The Legislature reduced the financial risks faced by the nonmovant by
simplifying the damages and costs required under the statute. Under the
new law, it will remain mandatory to award attorney’s fees and costs to a
prevailing movant;415 however, courts are no longer required to impose
sanctions. The court may impose sanctions on the nonmovant “as the court

411. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.0075.
412. See id. (addressing the effect of a ruling).
413. See Ghrist v. MBH Real Estate LLC, No. 02-17-00411-CV, 2018 WL 3060331, at *7 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth, June 21, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Civil practice and remedies code
section 27.009 mandates that if an action is dismissed under the TCPA, the trial court ‘shall award to
the moving party . . . court costs, reasonable attorney’s fees, and other expenses incurred in defending
against the legal action as justice and equity may require.’”).
414. Rich v. Range Res. Corp., 535 S.W.3d 610, 615 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, pet. denied)
(holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to award sanctions as the non-movant
“did not need additional deterrence”); Tatum v. Hersh, 559 S.W.3d 581, 588 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2018,
pet. denied) (“Furthermore, if the trial court determines that the plaintiff does not need deterring from
filing similar actions, the court may award a nominal sanction such as $1.00.”).
415. See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.009(a)(1) (expired Aug. 31, 2019) (“[I]f the court orders
dismissal of a legal action under this chapter, the court . . . shall award to the moving party court costs
and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in defending against the legal action . . . .”).
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determines sufficient to deter the party who brought the legal action from
bringing similar actions described in this chapter.”416
The Legislature retained the law’s authorization for a court to award
attorney’s fees and costs to a nonmovant when the motion to dismiss was
“frivolous or solely intended for delay.”417 Judicial findings were formerly
made only upon the request of a sanctioned movant; under the new law,
however, a court that imposes sanctions must now make findings regarding
the sanctions even without a request by the movant.418 There is no similar
finding requirement when a nonmovant is sanctioned under the new law’s
now-discretionary provision.
House Bill 2730 also addressed the question of sanctions when a
compulsory counterclaim meets with a TCPA motion to dismiss. A
counterclaim is compulsory “if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence
that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and does not require
for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction . . . .”419 The Legislature wrestled with whether to
exempt compulsory counterclaims from the TCPA altogether. There was
concern that if a TCPA motion to dismiss prevailed against a compulsory
counterclaim, it would be unfair to impose attorney’s fees, costs, and
sanctions on a party who was forced, by the rules, to either assert the claim
in good faith or forfeit it. Under the new TCPA, “the court may award to
the moving party reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in defending against
the counterclaim if the court finds that the counterclaim is frivolous or solely
intended for delay.”420 Thus, a TCPA motion to dismiss may be brought
against a compulsory counterclaim, but the financial risks to a party who
pleads in good faith were effectively reduced by this amendment to the
TCPA.
Finally, it seems that no litigation epidemic would be complete without
an “Oxford Comma”421 puzzle. The old TCPA provided that the court
“shall award to the moving party court costs, reasonable attorney’s fees, and
416. Id. § 27.009(a)(2).
417. Id. § 27.009(b).
418. See id. § 27.007(a) (“[T]he court shall issue findings regarding whether the legal action was
brought to deter or prevent the moving party from exercising constitutional rights and is brought for
an improper purpose, including to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or to increase the cost of
litigation.”).
419. TEX. R. CIV. P. 97(a).
420. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.009(c).
421. What Is the Oxford Comma?, LEXICO, https://www.lexico.com/explore/what-is-theoxford-comma [https://perma.cc/27D2-MGVR].
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other expenses incurred in defending against the legal action as justice and
equity may require . . . .”422 The Texas Supreme Court ruled that although
it is within a court’s discretion to determine what constitutes reasonable
attorney’s fees under the old TCPA, that discretion “does not also
specifically include considerations of justice and equity.”423 The Court
reasoned that if the Legislature intended such an analysis, it would have
placed a comma after “other expenses” to indicate that “as justice and equity
may require” was to modify all items in the series.424 To avoid any more
snares relating to the interpretation of what is and what is not modified by
placement of a comma and whether to consider justice and equity, the
Legislature simply removed the phrase “as justice and equity may require”
from the provision.425
VIII. CONCLUSION
Anti-SLAPP laws have been enacted by many jurisdictions, including
Texas, for laudable reasons. They have proven, to widely differing degrees
among those jurisdictions, to be effective at shifting the risk-reward calculus
of litigation in favor of those who exercise First Amendment rights. This is
especially important in the age of the Internet. The seismic shift caused by
the 2011 version of the original Texas statute, enacted with nary a word of
opposition,426 reverberated to such a great extent that by the end of 2018 a
sufficient number of diverse forces aligned in favor of reform and
compelled the Texas Legislature to substantially, yet carefully, overhaul the
law.
A product of extensive negotiation, the 2019 reform legislation brought
the law closer to its original purpose—the protection of constitutional
rights—and to the mainstream of jurisprudence and practice. The rights
protected by the new law are more clearly defined by hewing to established
principles, and procedures for resolving motions to dismiss more closely
aligned with familiar areas of practice. Some new provisions will broaden
the sweep of the prior law, including new express media protections and
applying it to declaratory relief actions. But, the primary purpose and
function of the legislation was to substantially narrow the application of the
422. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.009(a)(1) (expired Aug. 31, 2019).
423. Sullivan v. Abraham, 488 S.W.3d 294, 299 (Tex. 2016).
424. Id. at 298.
425. See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.009(a)(1) (showing deletion of phrase “as justice and equity
may require.”).
426. H.J. of Tex., 82d Leg., R.S. 4623 (2011).
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TCPA using various techniques, including changing definitions, removing
language previously construed as giving the statute extraordinary reach, and
exempting additional types of cases from the law altogether.
The new law will likely reduce the number of claims covered under the
anti-SLAPP law’s umbrella relative to the prior statute, the application of
which proved virtually limitless. On the other hand, the new statute is hardly
a straitjacket, and there will always be a place for advocacy in this vital realm.
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